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In this thesis, I set out to illustrate how epistemic injustice functions in this divide 
between white working-class men and the educated elite. I do this by discussing the 
discursive ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as 
legitimate sources of knowledge. I demonstrate this by using critical discourse analysis to 
interpret the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by Clinton and 
Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also discuss how these ideologies are 
positively or negatively perceived by Trump’s working-class base. Using feminist 
standpoint theory and phenomenology as a lens of interpretation, I argue that white 
working-class men are increasingly alienated from progressive politics through classist 
and ableist rhetoric. If progressives wish to win over white working-class men, they will 
need to ameliorate this division, otherwise this gap will continue to grow. Finally, I 
suggest class-sensitive approaches for moving forward and bridging this gap.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL GAP 
 Entry to university ushers a break with the fabric of the world, and we are invited, 
 if we are to hope for success to beckon with its elegant fingers, to come to feel a 
 repulsion to the politics of the poor. Reality gets lost in the race for the hyper-
 coherence of politically correct opinion and the games of good-conscience that 
 are the dominant motif of the conversations of radical intellectuals . . . The 
 embodied ethics of a silent group, unrepresented in the spaces of delicate 
 discussion, are never recognized, nor are the racism and intolerance, the deep 
 processes of abjection and uglification that are the very condition of the 
 experience of elite university-space that the bourgeois across the world are 
 willing to pay so much for. There is little that one can say . . . of the petty grand-
 narratives that pass so much muster among the radical intelligentsia . . . gaining 
 huge symbolic rewards for what amounts to a social parody obscuring the grounds 
 of their own privilege . . . [Too] much of their radical agenda . . . amounts to a 
 stigmatizing of some of the most powerless sections of society and ends in the 
 . . . exclusion of those already excluded. (Charlesworth 154-155) 
 
OVERVIEW 
 The purpose of this opening chapter is to join the conversation on the cultural and 
political gap between the educated elite and the white working-class. This chapter has 
three major goals. The first is to introduce the topic, the premise to my argument, and the 
concepts I use to support my argument. The second is to provide a literature review that 
gives the reader a sufficient background for the topic. The third is to describe the format 
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that this paper will follow. 
 
     INTRODUCTION 
 Leading up to and following the 2016 presidential election cycle in the United 
States, interest in the working-class emerged with questions concerning the 
demographic's political leanings. Traditionally depicted as heavily white and male, and 
more broadly, without a college education, campaign pundits and news commentators, 
liberal professionals in their educated enclaves, and others pondered how Republican 
candidate Donald Trump won the support of working-class people. How could the white 
working-class support a rich businessman like Donald Trump? Some ponderings, like 
those of National Review correspondent Kevin Williamson, were critical: 
 The [American underclass] may sing hymns to Trump the destroyer and whisper 
 darkly about “globalists” and – odious, stupid term — “the Establishment,” but 
 nobody did this to them. They failed themselves . . . The truth about these 
 dysfunctional, downscale communities is that they deserve to die. Economically, 
 they are negative assets . . . The white American underclass is in thrall to a 
 vicious, selfish culture whose main products are misery and used heroin needles. 
 Donald Trump’s speeches make them feel good. So does OxyContin.  
The sea of embittered white faces donning the infamous red "Make America Great 
Again" ballcaps on their heads at Trump's campaign rallies, through Rust Belt cities and 
across the nation, helped solidify a general impression of who Trump's constituents were, 
and for many other frustrated Americans, this also helped identify who was responsible 
and deserving of blame for a Trump presidency. One major culprit was white working-
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class men. 
 The popular narrative became that the disenfranchised white working-class were 
disenchanted with a seemingly out-of-touch Democratic Party, thereby flocking to 
support Donald Trump, the candidate who tapped into a slew of anxieties ranging from 
their anger toward immigrants, far removed politicians, an inefficient government, job 
loss, and economic shifts (Francis). However, this characterization of the typical Trump 
voter is only part of the story. Despite substantial support from the white working-class, 
the support of middle-class and upper-class white voters also made a significant impact in 
the electorate. Many of Trump’s voters had household incomes above the median of 
$56,000, in fact, the median household income of Trump primary voters was $72,000 
(Silver). 
 While a multitude of studies have considered the demographics of voters, this 
project is not another attempt to determine who is responsible for Trump's presidency. 
While these statistics can be a place for beginning to understand the Trump-supporting 
demographics, they may be referred to by those confused or disappointed with election 
results as an attempt to place blame. Many are trying to understand this specific political 
moment we are in, but in order to achieve this understanding we must move beyond 
identifying who voted for whom and focus on the how and why. This is why I am more 
concerned with the cultural divide such figures point to and the ways in which responses 
to these figures further demonstrate, and in fact reify, this exact divide. Rather than being 
empirical, this project is conceptual. Through this conceptual endeavor, I hope to tear 
down "empathy walls" and construct "empathy bridges," concepts sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild frequently returns to in Strangers in their own Land: Anger and Mourning on 
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the American Right, a valuable and compelling account of the gulf between conservative, 
white, working-class Tea Party members in Louisiana and those in liberal academic 
enclaves. 
 In this work, I set out to illustrate how epistemic injustice functions in the divide 
between white working-class men and the educated elite. I do this by discussing the 
discursive ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as 
legitimate sources of knowledge. I demonstrate this by using critical discourse analysis as 
a method for interpreting the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by 
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also 
discuss how these ideologies are positively or negatively perceived by Trump’s working-
class base. In this chapter, I articulate these arguments further. Using feminist standpoint 
theory and phenomenology as a lens of interpretation, I argue that white working-class 
men are increasingly alienated from progressive politics through classist and ableist 
rhetoric and that if progressives wish to win over white working-class men, they will 
need to ameliorate this division, otherwise this gap will continue to grow.  
 This thesis is organized into four chapters. This first chapter provides a literature 
review noting the historical and persisting association between class and intelligence, and 
literature on anti-intellectualism, identity, intersectionality, and masculinity. It also 
introduces the topic of epistemic injustice and the cultural divide between white, 
working-class men and the educated elite, specifically grounded in the moment of the 
2016 presidential election. The next chapter is on methodology, which addresses the 
conceptual frameworks I touch on in this first chapter, such as standpoint theory, 
phenomenology, and class identity, but in greater detail. It also explains my method of 
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analysis, critical discourse analysis. In the third chapter, I provide a critical discourse 
analysis of Hillary Clinton calling half of Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,” 
Donald Trump’s television advertisement responding to Clinton’s remarks, and his 
responding comments. These instances illustrate a divide between the white working-
class and the educated elite, epistemic injustice, and the resulting logic of working-class 
disdain for those with epistemic authority. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the broader 
political and social implications for my analysis and I conclude this thesis by 




 After reviewing the literature, which includes political writings, popular media, 
and academic scholarship, I have identified a notable gap in work criticizing or even 
acknowledging the Left’s engagement with classist or ableist rhetoric in their assessments 
of both Trump and his supporters. Andrew Harnish’s article, “Ableism and the Trump 
Phenomenon,” primarily assesses the ableism of Trump’s rhetoric which includes 
“repeated use of metaphors equating bodily difference with weakness and failure” and the 
embedded ableism of rural, white, working-class infrastructure and culture, but only 
peripherally touches on the Left’s hypocritical mocking of Trump’s bodily difference 
(423). Even Harnish’s criticism of the Left’s alarming willingness to engage in ableist 
mockery of Trump neglects to acknowledge the cognitive aspect of difference which 
includes the routine engagement in insulting the intellectual capacity of Trump and his 
supporters, which are highly perceived as rural, white, and working-class. 
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 A gap in the literature is certainly, at least in part, due to Trump’s election still 
being fairly recent, but the cultural gap between the educated elite and white working-
class voters has been growing for at least the last decade, when white working-class 
voters became a significant concern for Republican candidates seeking the presidency 
(for example, Sarah Palin’s Joe the Plumber references, and Mitt Romney’s struggle to 
appeal to the working-class). While literature addressing the educated elite’s usage of 
ableist rhetoric when referring to white working-class voters is absent, there is work, such 
as Mark Proudman’s “‘The Stupid Party’: Intellectual Repute as a Category of 
Ideological Analysis,” that addresses the historical, cultural, and political divide between 
Conservatives and Progressives, and the attribution of intelligence to some thoughts and 
ideas while denying it to others. There is also expansive scholarship on historical 
perceptions and constructions of rural, working-class, and poor whites as stupid, 
immoral, dirty, and lazy (Wray). I am suggesting that these older discourses have shaped 
present-day perceptions of the white working-class and are manifesting in the ways 
Trump and his white working-class base are perceived (as “deplorable” or stupid). 
 Stereotypes associating class with intelligence have deep historical roots. In her 
book White Trash: The 400-Year Untold Story of Class in America, Nancy Isenberg 
explains that these historical roots stretch through eugenicist thinking in the United States 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and even further back, tracing to 
European origins prior to expansions West. In the sixteenth century, Britain was 
becoming increasingly stratified, and the poor were seen as inferior to the wealthy, and 
more educated, aristocracy (Isenberg). Therefore, they were thought of as disposable 
“trash people,” or even a separate degenerate human breed (Isenberg). Beginning in the 
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early 1600s, these “trash people” were shipped off to the New World, or what Isenberg 
describes as a dumping ground for undesirables. Once relocated, these undesirables 
provided exploitable labor in Jamestown and what would later become established 
colonies (Isenberg). Their survival in those early years was ultimately insignificant to 
their country of origin because they were viewed as abundant and expendable (Isenberg). 
Isenberg writes that those who survived reproduced, providing more bodies for “an 
expendable class of laborers who made colonization possible . . . fertilizing the soil with 
their labor while finding it impossible to harvest any social mobility” themselves (42).  
 The poor were viewed as human waste and were imported by the Virginia 
Company as indentured servants and laborers, auctioned off to the privileged, wealthy, 
landowning few (Isenberg). In 1618, land was allotted based on a head count, so there 
was incentive to “import laborers, dead or alive” (Isenberg 26). Many of these imported 
laborers were orphans and adolescent boys who, under brutal conditions, were “literally 
worked to death” (Isenberg 28). By 1630, there was a mass migration to the Bay Colony 
(Isenberg 28). Isenberg writes that 21,000 settlers arrived, 40 percent of which were from 
areas with high percentages of Puritan converts. However, there was an equal number of 
“commercially driven emigrant[s] from . . . England . . . accompanied by their servants” 
(Isenberg 29). Approximately “60 percent of the arrivals were under the age of twenty-
four—one-third of them unattached males” (29). 
 Belief in the degeneracy of these poor, white, laborers, in the coming centuries 
would fester, and discourse would evolve to bolster eugenicist thinking and the further 
association of class with intelligence. By the 1800s, poor whites in the South were 
viewed as utterly worthless and inherently ignorant. Isenberg explains, 
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  No longer were white trash simply freaks of nature on the fringe of society; they 
 were now congenitally delinquent, a withered branch of the American family tree. 
 As a “fungus growth,” they could weaken the entire stock of southern society. 
 More than tallow-colored skin, it was the permanent mark of intellectual 
 stagnation, the “inert” minds, the “fumbling” speech, and the “stupid, moony 
 glare, like that of the idiot.” They were, it was said, of the “homo genus without 
 the sapien.” (180) 
The question, then, that was pondered by elite observers was “if poor white men were 
dragging down the rest of the nation” (Isenberg 198).  
 With the increasing popularity of statistical measurements of the human body, 
mind, and ability, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, IQ (intelligence 
quotient) tests emerged to classify individuals by their intellect (Isenberg; Davis). 
Findings gathered from the administering of these tests were used to justify prejudiced 
views of both poor white and black people in the South (Isenberg). Many of the 
historically contextualized negative perceptions of and prejudices against poor whites in 
the South were eventually extended to rural whites in general. Matt Wray, in his seminal 
work, Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness, traces the 
historical significance of words and phrases like “redneck,” “dirt-eater,” and “white 
trash,” and likewise contends that such methods of eugenics successfully shaped 
collective representations of and general discourse regarding lower-class whites vis à vis 
the professional middle-classes through the spreading of regionally-specific terms and 
perceptions of “white trash.” In time, and through discursive chains of association, “poor 
white trash” no longer referred exclusively to “a stigmatized and despised social group in 
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the South” (95), but to poor whites in other rural places as well, thereby extending the 
stigmatypes of "immoral, lazy, dirty, criminal, filthy, and perverse" more generally to 
include poor rural whites elsewhere (95).  
 Similar perceptions linger into the present. Working-class activist and writer 
Elliott identifies multiple definitions of the term “redneck” ranging from the denotative 
“member of the white rural laboring class” (277), to the connotative “person who 
advocates a provincial, conservative, often bigoted sociopolitical attitude characteristic of 
a redneck” (278), and finally to its usage by progressives, “Any person who is racist, 
violent, uneducated, and stupid (as if they are the same thing),” or “a synonym for every 
type of oppressive belief except classism” (280). Conservatism and bigotry or narrow-
mindedness has often been associated with archetypes of stupidity, while Progressivism 
has been associated with archetypes of intelligence and sophistication, argues Mark 
Proudman. He elaborates more on this cultural and political divide: 
 Leftists . . . frequently claim superior knowledge, intellectual competence, and 
 cultural sophistication . . . often based upon the universally explanatory power of 
 revered texts correctly interpreted . . . [and] reinforced by signifying terminology . 
 . . Rightist[s] . . . by contrast are less likely to appeal to such intellectualized kinds 
 of theory, and more likely to appeal to established morality, to patriotism, to other 
 group loyalties, to familiar customs, or . . . ‘common- sense.’ This . . . is a direct 
 invocation of intellectual disrepute, . . .  often combined with an attack on the 
 [Leftist’s] unpatriotic, unmanly, overly fancy, or theoretical character. (201) 
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Proudman goes on to claim that these differences correlate to class, with the Progressive 
intelligentsia having the power and influence to base their self-image on claims to 
superior intelligence. 
 The rigid and hierarchical divide between the rich and working-class individuals 
continues to function as an indication of intelligence. In part, this is due to the 
institutional role of education in immersing students in neoliberal discourses of a 
hierarchical social and economic world, “grounded in ideals of individual responsibility, 
autonomous transformation, deregulation of markets, and the diminished role of society,” 
as opposed to working for a collective good or finding happiness and fulfillment through 
one’s own internal sense of worth (Jones and Vagle 132). Such neoliberal discourses thus 
construct “hierarchies of desire, entitlement, intelligence, and worth as reflected in the 
stratified winners and losers of materialism and capitalism” (132). Through these 
discourses, privilege and exploitation are produced and upheld, individuals are socialized 
to believe in a limitless capacity to change their living conditions, and attention is steered 
away from criticizing government and economic policy responsible for shaping 
inequitable social and economic outcomes that limit an individual’s capacity to transform 
oneself in accordance to a neoliberal doctrine of self-development (Jones and Vagle). 
 In Thinking Class: Sketches from a Cultural Worker, Jo Kadi argues that “stupid” 
has become more than a description of someone’s intellectual ability, but rather that it is 
“a cultural concept with a particular code and set of signifiers that describe working-class 
people as the middle and upper classes perceive and construct [them]” (48-49). He 
describes his experience in academia as a working-class student, dealing with internalized 
feelings of class inferiority, and grappling with feeling as if privileged people belonged in 
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higher education and he did not. He often struggled to feel welcome with the prevailing 
attitudes, held by others and internalized, that working-class people were “too stupid to 
study, learn, think, analyze, [or] critique” (41). According to Kadi, the capitalist system 
depends on those “bred for stupid and/or dangerous work” believing they are less 
intelligent than those in charge (43). To explain the reasoning for this, Kadi suggests that 
the false perception that working-class people are intellectually inferior functions to 
justify class divisions, and ultimately, class oppression.  
 Kadi’s account is especially valuable for its deconstruction of the term “stupid,” 
often defined as “slow of mind, obtuse, brutish” (48). Despite “rationally” knowing that it 
was a lie, Kadi recounts internalizing the belief that intelligence and class are related, 
believing in his own stupidity as a working-class person, and the stupidity of the 
working-class (40). Kadi describes the “cultural baggage” of stupidity as an embodied 
experience which he “learned in his bones before [he] could talk” (48). This account is 
filled with language that acknowledges a pre-reflective knowledge, or a “infraconscious 
competence that is a result of their immersion within the realm of the social” 
(Charlesworth 29). Kadi’s description of stupidity as “cultural baggage” also brings to 
light the ableist connotations and history of the term “stupid,” including systemic abuses 
against the neuro-divergent, non-consensual experimental medical procedures, and forced 
sterilizations (Stern). A hierarchy of the moral goodness, worth, or value of intelligence is 
in itself ableist. 
 Additionally, Kadi challenges how intelligence and knowledge is defined and 
brings recognition to a variety of forms of knowledge by highlighting the fact that many 
top paying jobs do not require intelligence or creativity while many working-class jobs 
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do. Kelly Bradbury makes a similar argument in her book Reimagining Popular Notions 
of American Intellectualism: Literacy, Education, and Class, by proposing a broader and 
more democratic definition of intellectualism through her research of sites that are not 
normally considered to be intellectual. Bradbury argues that people outside the typical 
realms of intellectualism do engage in intellectual work and are intellectual, maintaining 
that her research  
 work[s] to contest assumptions that the study of useful knowledge, education for a 
 practical purpose, basic literacy education, adult education in general, and 
 education at non-elite institutions have not fostered—or cannot foster—
 intellectualism among the American public. (28) 
Gramsci, too, claims that “technical education, closely bound to industrial labor, even at 
the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of 
intellectual,” expressing the intellectual value of the working-class and of practical, 
experiential knowledge (9-10). In this sense, I am rejecting intellectualism in its elitist, 
classist, and ableist form that attempts to invalidate other types of knowing, and 
proposing, like Bradbury, that what is considered valid intellectually should be broadened 
so that other forms of knowing can “count.” Even then, intellectualism should not deny 
an individual the right or legitimacy to having valued experiences and perspectives on 
matters in their life. 
 Perpetuating ideas that class and intelligence are correlated serves a hegemonic 
purpose. It is important to note that one of the most critical aspects to maintaining the 
present class structure is working-class people internalizing the belief that they are 
intellectually inferior in many respects, and that it is intellect that is responsible for 
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greater economic success. This diverts attention away from systemic oppression and 
centers it on meritocratic understandings of success (Kadi). Fostering this divide, and 
even encouraging anti-intellectual or anti-elite sentiment among the working-class may in 
fact reinforce this class structure, especially in the case that these sentiments also serve to 
inform an understanding that higher education is a place for only a certain kind of 
individual, namely, an individual with class privilege.  
 Both Kelly Bradbury and Daniel Rigney discuss this concept of anti-
intellectualism at length, each referring primarily to the most popular work on the topic, 
Richard Hofstadter’s 1963 book, Anti-intellectualism in American Life. In his Pulitzer 
Prize winning work, Hofstadter defines anti-intellectualism as “resentment and suspicion 
of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition 
constantly to minimize the value of that life” (7). Hofstadter’s work, in addition to The 
Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom in 1987, and The Dumbest Generation, 
by Mark Bauerlein in 2008, portray anti-intellectualism as a resentment of intellectuals 
and intellectual life1. While Lemann notes that Hofstadter does not depict “American life 
as a struggle between the superior, enlightened few and the mass of yobs,2” Bradbury 
argues that, collectively, these authors have contributed to a public discourse that only 
certain kinds of people can be intellectuals or engage in intellectual life. This rhetoric has 
contributed to understandings of who qualifies as an intellectual and who does not, and in 
the same vein, whose knowledge is legitimate and whose is not (Rigney; Bradbury). 
                                                        
1 To clarify, throughout this thesis I use “intellectuals” and the “educated elite” interchangeably, but it is 
worth noting that I am not negatively referring to intelligent people or intelligence, but rather the culture of 
elitism that is associated with privileged access to education and intellectual life. “Intellectual life” refers to 
institutionalized and legitimized forms of knowledge often associated with the academy. 
2 A “yob” is a slang term used in the UK that refers to an uncultured or unsophisticated person, usually 
working-class and male. 
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Consequently, these understandings of who is and who is not an intellectual function to 
hegemonically reinforce a hierarchy of knowledge, and as hegemony typically functions, 
maintain the present ideologies, norms, values, institutions, and structures that benefit the 
dominant class (Gramsci).  
 Together, Bradbury alleges, these authors depict American society as having 
descended from intelligence to apathy and ignorance, and that technology is dumbing 
down society. It may be heavy-handed to include Hofstadter in such a claim, however, 
due to his argument being that anti-intellectualism has been an unavoidable part of 
American democracy from the beginning (Lemann). Nevertheless, Bradbury’s point 
stands that these three primary texts are responsible for shaping much of the conversation 
of anti-intellectualism in the United States. 
 Rigney discusses anti-elitism as one facet of anti-intellectualism, connecting to 
class. Others, such as working-class people, interpret some intellectual values as elitist 
which can illicit “mistrust of claims to superior knowledge . . . on the part of an educated 
elite, especially when such claims are suspected to be instruments in the service of class 
privilege” (Rigney 441). These thoughts among working-class people and others 
marginalized by their socioeconomic status have historically contributed to the 
development of populist movements, as they are seen to be more representative of 
“common people,” devaluing “theoretic learning” as evidence of privilege. This leads to 
the working-class idealized image of  “the rough and ready man of action . . .  
unencumbered by the weight of too much book learning” (Rigney 441). So, it is apparent 
that the debates of intellectualism and elitism also carry a gendered element, depicting a 
man ready for action, rather than an “unmanly” or “effeminate” intellectual male, as the 
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stereotype goes (Rigney 442). In what follows, I will elaborate on the construction of 
masculinity, as well as its variations as it intersects with class and race. 
 David Roediger notes that multiple axes of identity are invoked simply in the 
word “worker,” presuming both whiteness and maleness, despite the fact that average 
workers are increasingly people of color and women. The phrase “working man” denotes 
both a gender and class identity, but also a racial identity, “an identification of whiteness 
and work so strong that it need not even be spoken” (Roediger 19). Although the 
naturalness of the category of the white worker or the working man is problematic in its 
exclusion of people of color and women, it is crucial to understand the historic weight of 
invoking and claiming the identity of “working man” for all of the gendered, classed, and 
raced undertones contained within it. Since Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term 
“intersectionality” in 1989, intersectional approaches to scholarly work on identity have 
become popular across disciplines (Hancock). Intersectionality helps to account for the 
multiple and overlapping identities that people hold, including: race, ethnicity, gender, 
sex, sexual orientation, class, and ability. Intersectionality is important for thinking about 
the ways in which systems of oppression intersect and even constitute one another. I 
include intersectionality in this project because it is crucial for thinking about white 
working-class men and the nuances of their positioning within society. Because they are 
white and men, identity politics tends to leave them out3, but recognizing how their 
gender, race, and class intersect can allow us to be more aware of both their privilege and 
class marginalization, helping us to build bridges of inclusion.  
                                                        
3 This is in part due to the prevailing discourse that the status of “man” or “white” are the default and that 
gender or race must refer to any deviation from that default (Beauvoir; Crenshaw). 
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 In this work, I understand gender not as a stable identity that one holds, but rather 
a repeated set of external acts and gestures that, through their performance, socially 
construct the gender they are said to embody (Butler). This repetition of the performative 
construction of gender through time allows for a fluid conceptualization of gender, as it is 
socially constructed and varies by social context, time, and place (Butler). Gender 
requires repeated performativity and repeated proof, as total and perfect acquisition or 
performance of gender is always elusive and never possible (Butler; West and 
Zimmerman). Still, some may inevitably live up to the standards better than others and 
come quite close to embodying aspects of the fluctuating standards at times, resulting in 
the development of gender hierarchies (Connell and Messerschmidt). It is because gender 
is unstable and constructed through time that these standards and expectations vary 
(Butler). These variances result in multiple masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt).  
 In local contexts, with the developing of dominant and subordinate masculinities 
in relation to one another, “protest masculinities” can emerge (Connell and 
Messerschmidt). Protest masculinities demonstrate how subordinate masculinities can 
develop to help “recognize the agency of . . . marginalized groups” (847).  One such 
example of a protest masculinity develops among working-class men, enabling a “claim 
to power typical of regional hegemonic masculinities in Western countries . . . [despite] 
lack[ing] the economic resources and institutional authority that underpins the regional 
global patterns” of hegemonic masculinity (848). This type of protest masculinity is a 
construction of a version of masculinity that identifies with another specific group 
characteristic or identity, such as being working-class, disabled, or queer (Connell and 
Messerschmidt; Coston and Kimmel). 
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 Bethany Coston and Michael Kimmel elaborate on what can be understood as 
protest masculinities in their article “Seeing Privilege Where it isn’t: Marginalized 
Masculinities and the Intersectionality of Privilege.” They discuss the marginalized status 
of gay men, men with disabilities, and working-class men, noting that, despite being 
privileged in their male status, these men still experience marginalization in other facets 
of their identity. Working-class men are both othered by dominant masculinities and by 
themselves through insisting that they are different from upper and middle-class men 
(Coston and Kimmel). However, some may take it further to suggest that the physical 
requirements of their manual labor, or the risk inherent to their occupations, render their 
masculinity superior to middle-class men working office jobs, which are thought to be 
more leisurely and less requiring of hard work (Coston and Kimmel; Morris). The 
working-class claim to masculinity is attacked due to their marginalized class status. In 
some cases, they may respond to this with the absolute refusal to “’upper-class’ 
imperatives,” such as “social mobility, knowledge and skill acquisition,” and thus, they 
may instead choose to “reproduce themselves as working class, despite the social and 
financial consequences” (Coston and Kimmel 109). 
 Employing Goffman’s strategies for stigma management, Coston and Kimmel 
suggest that men with marginalized masculinities may respond to their marginalization 
by seeking to emphasize their differences from the dominant group, trying to emphasize 
their similarities to a dominant group, or emphasizing their differences and claiming that 
they are in fact superior to the dominant group. The distancing that occurs through 
emphasizing differences between the dominant and marginalized groups can explain the 
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distancing that occurs when working-class people differentiate themselves from elite 
intellectuals (Coston and Kimmel). 
 I include the intersectionality of privilege and Coston and Kimmel’s work on 
marginalized men’s strategies for responding to their marginalization because this work 
is crucial for understanding epistemic injustice and the nuanced experiences and 
perspectives that white, working-class men have, especially in the context of the 2016 
presidential election. I will explain this further in the following section. 
 
THE GAP BETWEEN WHITE WORKING-CLASS MEN  
AND THE EDUCATED ELITE 
 In this current political milieu, a sharp distinction between members of the white 
working-class and the intellectual educated elite is gaining momentum. Such a divide 
further perpetuates the exclusion and self-exclusion of working-class people. Considering 
legitimated and delegitimated forms of knowledge, perception, status, disposition, and 
speech in his influential book, A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience, Simon 
Charlesworth contends that because working-class people are denied the economic and 
cultural resources to found lives of self-value through the primary institutions of 
legitimacy, they “elect to exclude themselves in an attempt to exercise symbolically a 
volition effectively denied them” (235). However, this “assertion of cultural identity . . . 
emerges out of an implicit sense of oneself as devalued, as fractured and damaged, as 
‘not clever’ and thus condemned to a life of insecurity and hardship” (235). During the 
2016 presidential election, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton described Trump's 
supporters as falling into two baskets, one of which being those who feel the government 
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has failed them and simply want change, and the other being a "basket of deplorables" 
who are "racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, [and] islamaphobic [sic]" (Reilly). 
Following Clinton's comments came both Far-Right backlash and the reclaiming of the 
term “deplorable” among Trump's supporters. This instance notably illustrates a divide 
between the educated elite and the working-classes; especially because the term 
“deplorable” itself is not reflective of working-class speech, although it was reclaimed in 
spite and taken up as a badge of honor. This reveals a potential “implicit sense of oneself 
as devalued,” but it also illustrates a simultaneous exclusion and self-exclusion 
(Charlesworth 235).   
 Specifically, this project is concerned with exclusion and the class cultural divide 
Joan C. Williams identifies in her book White Working Class: Overcoming Class 
Cluelessness in America. My work is different from previous work on the topic of white 
working-class men because I build on Williams's idea of a class-cultural divide, made 
most visible in US politics in the last decade, and I introduce Miranda Fricker's concept 
of epistemic injustice, which she defines as “[being] wronged in one’s capacity as a 
knower” (44), to the discussion of white working-class men and politics in the United 
States. Indeed, white working-class men are often victims of class marginalization, and 
their situated knowledges are rendered unheard and unacknowledged through a process 
of epistemic injustice. Through strategies of epistemic injustice, white working-class men 
are increasingly alienated from progressive politics. Thus, I argue, by way of feminist 
standpoint theory and phenomenology, that white working-class men are situated in a 
particular embodied and social position that provides access to a horizon of knowledge 
useful for understanding intersecting systems of oppression, particularly along the axes of 
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class, gender, race, and ability. Often in critiquing working-class discourses that are 
(overly) characterized by elements of racism and sexism, progressives, academics, and 
intellectuals invoke classist and ableist rhetoric, ultimately reinscribing a cultural divide 
between the working-classes and the educated elite. Such rhetoric further alienates and 
stigmatizes white working-class men, reinforces the association of class with intelligence, 
obscures the intersectionality of privilege, and strengthens responding disdain among 
white working-class men for those in positions of high status, whom they understand to 
be the elite, generally considered to be gatekeepers of legitimated knowledge and have 
epistemic authority. 
 In addition to arguing for an understanding of the epistemic positioning of white 
working-class men via phenomenology and standpoint, I also utilize critical discourse 
analysis as a reflexive methodological tool in order to help illustrate my claims. I apply 
critical discourse analysis to specific instances including Hillary Clinton calling half of 
Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,” Donald Trump’s response through a thirty 
second television advertisement, and his responding comments given at a rally in 
Asheville, North Carolina a few days after Clinton’s initial remarks. I analyze these 
textual examples because they are “critical discourse moments,” such moments that, 
according to Anabela Carvalho, challenge established discursive positions and are 
defined through political activity and socially relevant events (166).  
 By delving into the situated knowledge and social positioning of white working-
class men, I want to better understand the nuanced concept of epistemic credibility and 
the injustice that occurs when such credibility is denied. Fricker best articulates the 
epistemic consequences that occur through both testimonial injustice—the diminished 
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credibility of the speaker due to the hearer’s prejudices—and hermeneutical injustice—
the diminished intelligibility of a marginalized person’s experiences due to a 
community’s lack in hermeneutical resources. These concepts are crucial for recognizing 
the connections between identity and material conditions, and further, how such identities 
and material conditions are organized by the inclusion and exclusion of particular voices 
(Kokushkin).   
 Fricker argues that the consequences of epistemic injustice include both an ethical 
and a political dimension that enables further domination. She further contends that “to 
be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to 
human value . . . [bearing] a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than fully 
human” (44). Fricker acknowledges the identity prejudice that associates working-class 
people, among other historically powerless groups such as women or people of color, 
with "attribute[s] inversely related to competence or sincerity"; however, she does not 
exclusively focus her attention on the lived, material, and situated experiences of white 
working-class people (32). Her assessment of epistemic injustice is of oppressed groups 
in general.  
  Central to such conversations of knowledge and credibility are the concepts of 
identity, situated knowledge, and lived experience. Thinking through epistemic injustice 
alongside embodied notions of identity and perception is helpful for providing a more 
nuanced conception of epistemic injustice. I use standpoint epistemology and 
phenomenology in order to consider these concepts in their full complexity. Helping to 
articulate what is known and from what position within society, standpoint epistemology 
asserts that lived experience and situated knowledge provides a position of epistemic 
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privilege (Harstock; P.H. Collins). In other words, lived experience is a legitimate and 
valuable source of knowledge. While phenomenology differs from standpoint in some 
ways, I find its emphasis on embodiment, perception, and the unification of the mind and 
body, and thus, the equal valuing of cognitive and physical forms of knowledge 
acquisition, to be complementary to standpoint’s focus on lived experience and situated 
knowledge (Harstock; Merleau-Ponty; P.H. Collins). 
 Because identity and social positioning are often interconnected, I consider 
Alcoff’s contention that there is indeed a correlation between social identity and 
epistemic credibility. Likewise, Mohanty argues that “social locations facilitate or inhibit 
knowledge by predisposing us to register and interpret information in certain ways. Our 
relation to social power produces “forms of blindness,” just as it enables “degrees of 
lucidity” (234). Alcoff’s understanding of this is that “identities operate as horizons from 
which certain aspects or layers of reality can be made visible,” thereby asserting that 
“social identity operates then as a rough and fallible but useful indicator of differences in 
perceptual access” (82). Thus, I take inspiration from Alcoff's existential, 
phenomenological, and hermeneutic conception of identity as horizon, “a site from which 
one is open to the world, a site from which one must engage in the process of meaning-
making” (Alcoff 43). 
  A knowledge claim developed through access to perceptual facts, Alcoff 
contends, "needs to be supported by a theory of perception" (83). Such a theory of 
perception is found in the work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty who posits 
that knowledge is based in perception and the situated, concrete, and dynamic bodily 
experience. Complementing notions of perceptual access, I turn to phenomenological 
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concepts of reflective and pre-reflective knowledge which are acquired through embodied 
experience (Moran and Mooney). Phenomenology functions as a methodological 
conception focused not on the “what” but on the “how” of embodied perception and 
situated knowledge (Moran and Mooney). Charlesworth writes of this crucial 
situatedness claiming that  
 [one] is touched by one’s environment, such that one comes to recognize the 
 solicitations of the world, and respond through the primary bodily rhythms of fear 
 and insecurity, the primary affective sense, through which locality and self-hood 
 emerge from the flow of perceptual and practical sense that root us in a particular 
 world. (129) 
 According to Charlesworth, working-class people experience the world in a less 
mediated way than those with greater access to symbolic capital. A greater proximity to 
need impacts bodily hexis, comportment, and gestures, as well as speech habits, and ways 
of relating to language in general. In contrast, the dominant class is likely to invest “its 
relation to language with the same distancing intention it engages in its relation to the 
body” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 149). These claims are similar to Marx’s, with which he 
asserts that capitalists are disembodied or have access to a surrogate body, with more 
layers of capital between themselves and the material conditions of life in comparison to 
the working-classes whose bodies are exposed to the harsh conditions of labor and 
necessity. This might be especially true for those in physically demanding jobs where 
injury is more likely to occur, such as logging and coal or steel mining, jobs which tend 
to be male-dominated, especially in rural areas (“Those Who Work” Sherman).  
 The assertion of the validity of knowledge acquired through embodiment parallels 
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standpoint’s similar privileging of situated knowledge. These ideas also counter the 
historical devaluing of experiential and pre-reflective knowledge in comparison to the 
knowledge of reason and reflection, and work to subvert the Cartesian mind/body duality 
by insisting that all knowledge and consciousness is necessarily embodied, a cornerstone 
to phenomenological thought (Merleau-Ponty; P.H. Collins). Recognizing the 
delegitimation of working-class knowledge and experience through the delegitimation of 
the body, I will explore the continued discursive association of class with intelligence: the 
stereotype that working-class people are intellectually inferior functions to justify class 
divisions, and ultimately, class oppression (Kadi). This rhetoric has also contributed to 
understandings of who qualifies as an intellectual and who does not, and in the same 
vein, whose knowledge is legitimate and whose is not (Bradbury; Rigney). Consequently, 
these understandings of who is and who is not an intellectual function to hegemonically 
reinforce a hierarchy of knowledge, and maintain the present ideologies, norms, values, 
institutions, and structures that benefit the dominant classes (Gramsci). This hierarchy of 
knowledge stems from the aforementioned Cartesian mind/body duality that posits that 
intelligence is a characteristic of the mind and is associated with reason. It is by this 
access to reason that humans are thought to be superior to other animals. Reason being 
the distinctive feature suggests that the mind is superior to the body and this belief has 
been absorbed into the fabric of Western thought for centuries. 
 Being denied the legitimacy of the life of the mind, working-class people are 
reduced to their bodies (Charlesworth). Due to the gendered pressures of “breadwinning,” 
the expectation for men to work to provide an income intended to fully support their wife 
and children, this emphasis on a bodily capacity to labor may also be especially gendered 
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to men (Kimmel and Ferber). Connell notes that “[t]rue masculinity is almost always 
thought to proceed from men's bodies—to be inherent in a male body or to express 
something about a male body” (44). Such a bodily focus translates to labor, constituting 
an intrinsic aspect of working-class identity (Charlesworth).  
 A working-class emphasis on the body is apparent in a conversation Charlesworth 
describes having with a young working-class adolescent who believes his teachers direct 
him in ways that make him feel as if there are things he is unable to do. Thus, he 
struggles in school and does not feel like education is the route for him. The fifteen-year-
old explains that this impacts how he views the future for possible work and concludes 
that because he does not have “much of a brain,” he might as well use his body since he 
has that (Charlesworth 240). This conversation highlights the nominating power of the 
institution of education and for those in positions of epistemic authority (in this case, the 
teachers), and how working-class people are relegated to a realm of the physical where 
they are destined to work with their bodies, and “find expertise in the realm of the 
competence they are constituted as possessing” (Charlesworth 241). This dualism leaves 
working-class people, specifically working-class men, with their material bodies whose 
only devalued legitimacy comes from the labor or technical skills they are able to 
perform. 
 Finally, I will discuss the implications of denying white working-class men 
epistemic credibility, one major trend being a disdain for educated people in positions of 
high status, generally considered to have epistemic authority. Some examples of figures 
with epistemic authority are academics, politicians, and reporters/the news media. One 
important caveat is that although Trump is a politician, he has portrayed himself as an 
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outsider to politics, and therefore, by his supporters, he is understood not as a 
representative of epistemic authority, but as a successful and self-made businessman who 
represents the interests of others who have felt like an outsider to politics. Additionally, 
there is a persistent, and perhaps contradictory, belief among working-class people that 
there is some correlation between intelligence and wealth (Lamont). So, while some of 
the wealthy are viewed positively, there is also a disdain for those intellectuals who are 
associated with elitism and legitimized, institutionalized forms of knowledge. This trend 
of disdain for epistemic authority as a response to epistemic injustice points to a larger, 
pre-existing cultural divide between the (white) working-class as “common people” and 
























 This chapter details the methodological basis of this project by expanding on the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations and the method of analysis I am using. I explain 
the concepts of the intersectionality of privilege, multiple axes of identity, epistemic 
injustice, and how I determine class identity. I incorporate theories of phenomenology 
and standpoint epistemology with these concepts. Finally, I describe how I understand 
critical discourse analysis as a method, and how I plan to apply these concepts to the 
discussion of white working-class men and epistemic injustice. 
 
PRIVILEGE AS INTERSECTIONAL 
 Understanding privilege as multifaceted and intersectional, involving the multiple 
identities each individual holds, is important for understanding the experiences of white 
working-class men. Privilege, the special rights or advantages granted to certain 
individuals or groups, is typically associated with whiteness and maleness. However, in 
terms of their class positioning, white working-class men are marginalized.  
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 Nell Painter describes the intersectionality of privilege, as it pertains to whiteness, 
suggesting that,  
 The degree to which white identity alone confers privilege is mediated more so 
 than in the past by the significance of other variables—class, gender, region, age, 
 able-bodiedness, sexuality, and so on. (388) 
Indeed, with stagnating wages since the 1970s, job losses in industrial occupations, and 
the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, many members of the white working-
class are now in economically precarious positions (Sherman). Linda Martín Alcoff 
asserts that this increase in economic instability among white working-class people is not 
due to being targeted because they are white, but rather, as economist Richard Wolff 
argues, evidences that their whiteness does not protect them from the economic damages 
of imperial capitalism. 
 The intersectionality of privilege also relates to a larger understanding of subjects 
and their intermeshedness within multiple systems of power. Lugones, for example, does 
not accept a simple oppressor/oppressed binary and instead proposes subjects as 
oppressing, being oppressed, and resisting depending on the context. Nodding to 
Lugones, Mariana Ortega writes,  
 There is not a simple dichotomy between marginalized/nonmarginalized or     
 oppressed/oppressor. Selves need to be understood in their complexity and in 
 terms of the different roles they play in the matrix of power relations such that 
 each of us can be understood variously as oppressors, oppressed, or resisting. 
 (51) 
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 Including the intersectionality of privilege in this project and frequently returning 
to it is significant because the attitude that white working-class men are not oppressed in 
any way has contributed to their alienation. Thus, it is worth remembering that just as 
identities and systems of oppression are complex, varied, and intersecting, so too is the 
notion of privilege. 
 
DETERMINING CLASS IDENTITY 
 To discuss issues pertaining to the working-class, it is essential to be clear with 
what is meant by the term “working-class” and how it is used in this project. The term is 
used extensively and frequently, but precise definitions are hard to come by and often 
disputed. Class itself becomes a blurred category, with most Americans tending to refer 
to themselves as middle-class, a flaw Joan Williams identifies as “class cluelessness.” For 
example, Williams cites that it is not uncommon for individuals making incomes as 
disparate as $22,000 or $200,000 to both identify themselves as middle-class. 
Determining an objective definition of social class and socioeconomic status, in general, 
is a contentious process. A Marxian definition of working-class includes anyone who 
does not own the means of production and therefore must sell their labor power; 
however, this definition is rather broad and could extend from manual laborers or factory 
workers, who are more traditionally thought of as working-class, to individuals with 
skills more often associated with those belonging to the middle or even upper-class. More 
generally, working-class can be understood as being comprised of those without a college 
education, who must rely on performing physical labor for an hourly wage (Edsall). 
Typically, working-class occupations have been broken down into four main categories: 
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unskilled laborers, artisans, outworkers, and factory workers (Doob). This includes 
service work and pink collar jobs (Arnold). If defined in terms of income, individuals 
falling into the categories of working-class, middle-class, or upper-class often have 
differential access to economic and cultural resources, or education, goods, and other 
services (Linkon).  
 Not only are objective measures of social class and socioeconomic status difficult 
to establish, they are also not always the best indicators of an individual’s actual standard 
of living (Rubin et al.). There are many complications associated with categorizing class 
and status in such a way. For example, how many categories should be included? How 
should cut off points for each category of class be determined? Answers to these critical 
questions are debated and often vary. These are the primary reasons why clear definitions 
of working-class, middle-class, or social class, in general, are so hard to delineate 
(Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class”; Rubin et al.). Furthermore, Bourdieu explains 
that “clear-cut discontinuities” are “impossible to find in the real world” to demonstrate 
such distinct, objective, and empirical instances of class (2). Other limitations include 
restricted generalizability of data due to the fact that findings can only be interpreted 
relative to the populations from which they are taken, meaning that the measures are 
limited to a specific context and period of time (Rubin et al.). Because populations and 
economies can vary quite rapidly, it is likely that objective measures will quickly become 
outdated (Rubin et al.). Additionally, and most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, 
objective measures do not necessarily assess one’s subjective understanding of their 
social class or identity (Rubin et al.). 
 As Williams, among other scholars, notes, class, in the colloquial sense of the 
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term, is often about more than just income or money. An amalgamation of traditions, 
behaviors, and ways of life help shape what we then identify as social class or 
socioeconomic status. To clarify, there is a distinction between social class and 
socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status can be understood as “one’s current social 
and economic situation” and can vary over time (Rubin et al. 196). Social class, on the 
other hand, tends to be more stable over time, and “refers to one’s sociocultural 
background” (Rubin et al. 196).  
 Objective measures of a one’s social class are typically figured by referring to 
their level of education, income, occupation, and material possessions (Rubin et al.). Like 
Rubin et al., Honneth also differentiates between class and status, but defines them 
differently. According to Honneth, class relates to distributive dimensions and economic 
modes of social ordering typically institutionalized through markets, while status 
corresponds to dimensions of social recognition derived from institutionalized patterns of 
cultural values and norms. Honneth goes further to contextualize class and status within 
systems of power and subordination. Despite Honneth’s distinction between class and 
status, he is careful to emphasize that there are points of overlap and even mutual 
constitution between the two at times, although one cannot directly infer the other. 
However, Honneth maintains that it is essential to refer to both the dimension of status 
and class to better understand social life. Both Rubin et al.’s and Honneth’s 
understandings are useful here because they help to provide a fuller view of class and 
status. 
 Thus, while objective measures of social class can provide fruitful data for 
empirical research, in many respects they are limited, especially in the realm of 
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qualitative research assessing identity. With this being said, it is also clear that we are 
considering the working-class as having to do with more than simply a category of 
income. By integrating a subjective definition of social class, we can help ensure a more 
accurate depiction of an individual’s perceived identity, and compensate for what 
objective measures might be unable to ascertain (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class”; 
Rubin et al.). Subjective measures of social class can better assess multiple factors in 
constructing class identity that objective measures might overlook. These factors include 
economic, cultural, informational, social, and symbolic forms of capital (Bourdieu “What 
Makes a Social Class”). Subjective measures are more contextually flexible, allowing for 
intersectional analyses of social class with other demographical categories like gender, 
ethnicity, or age (Rubin et al.). For those concerned with the validity of a subjective 
measure, inaccuracies (e.g. someone describing themselves as working-class despite 
having an income of $200,000 that indicates they are likely not working-class) can be 
controlled for by more objective measures—another crucial reason for integrating both 
measures (Rubin et al.). 
 For this discussion, a subjective measure is particularly relevant because an 
individual’s perceived identity is influential in their perception of if they belong in a 
social space (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class”). Therefore, by “working-class,” I 
am primarily referring to people that self-identify as or associate themselves with the 
working-class. Bourdieu writes, “agents are both classified and classifiers, but they 
classify according to (or depending upon) that position within classifications” (“What 
Makes a Social Class” 2). In other words, individuals can be identified or placed within a 
social class by objective measures or by others, and they can place themselves within or 
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identify with a social class, but the identification with a social class is also according to or 
depending upon their subject positioning, which determines how individuals are 
perceived and how individuals perceive themselves. These perceptions influence and are 
influenced by one’s habitus, which is a simultaneous process of perceiving and reacting, 
both a reflecting and reproducing of social structure (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social 
Class”). Thus, subjects within a similar social structure, under similar conditions begin to 
“resemble one another . . . [and] come together as a practical group . . . to reinforce their 
points of resemblance” (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class” 6). Put differently, 
habitus is the exposure to similar conditions of existence and conditioning factors that 
tend to produce individuals with similar dispositions, practices, and identities (Bourdieu 
“What Makes a Social Class” 6). Subjective identities of social class, or the social groups 
with which one relates to or associates with, develop within a habitus. This understanding 
of identity and environment as co-constitutive reveals “the similar objective conditions, 
or habitus, in which people from different social classes live, including their different 
access to social, cultural, economic, and symbolic capital” (Rubin et al. 198).  
 Thinking through the overlapping of class/status and socioeconomic status/social 
class alongside Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, we can consider class and status as 
lived-in categories of self-identification, developed over time, and situated within 
systems of power. This conceptualization of class and status, as mutually imbricated 
aspects of identity and lived-reality, situated within systems of power, is important for 
considering the impacts of economic downturn, the precarity of 
unemployment/underemployment, and rural poverty on white working-class men’s 
identities.  
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 INTERSECTING AXES OF IDENTITY AND THE “WORKING MAN” 
 The identity of a “working man” is deceptively complex, invoking a lot more than 
simply a man who works. Embedded in this term are also implicit understandings of 
class, masculinity, ability, morality, and whiteness (Roediger; Sherman). The notion of 
the white working-class is a recent phenomenon, emerging in the nineteenth century with 
efforts to distinguish the non-slave labor force from “the bondage of Blacks [which] 
served as a touchstone by which dependence and degradation were measured” (Roediger 
20). Prior to the nineteenth century, there were no definitive connections between 
whiteness and “the defense of one’s independence as a worker” (Roediger 20-21). 
According to Roediger, the formation of the identity of the working-class in America 
coincided with the development of a systematic consciousness of whiteness, and so the 
two are intertwined (8). Despite an increasingly large presence of people of color and 
women in the working-class, a “worker” continues to imply male and white (Arnold; 
Roediger). 
 Embedded in the term “working man” are also deeply gendered meanings and 
standards of morality. “Manly dignity” is important to white working-class men 
(Williams 91). This dignity is often found in the ability to financially provide for a 
family, a value that is similar for men from the middle and even upper-class (Williams). 
However, in recent decades, the traditionally masculine role of “breadwinner” has been 
challenged by economic shifts that have resulted in job losses in male-dominated 
occupations (Sherman; Smith). This has been particularly devastating for rural 
communities whose economies relied primarily on a single industry such as coal, steel,  
textiles, or logging (Sherman). These changes in the economy have forced many families 
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to renegotiate gender roles, as women have entered the workforce to contribute to family 
finances, or in some cases, to become the family’s sole breadwinner (Sherman; Smith). 
Men have especially struggled to reconfigure their identities and self-worth outside of the 
breadwinning status (Charlesworth; Sherman). Sherman explains that the myth of 
traditional masculinity is still present, but to navigate these challenges, “the requirements 
of masculinity have changed to focus more directly on work ethics than on breadwinning 
itself” (125). This shift in focus introduced a stronger emphasis on moral capital, a kind 
of social or symbolic capital (Sherman). In working-class contexts, such moral capital 
might be attainable through focus on work ethic and family life (Pini and Conway; 
Sherman).  
 The term “working man” implies a certain level of ability or physicality. A 
capacity for endurance is expected and injury or the wearing down of the body is 
understood as an expected outcome of a life of labor and struggle (Puar). In the event of 
an injury that prohibits work, Sherman identifies government assistance as a “last resort” 
for those living in economic precarity in rural communities, acceptable only under the 
pretense of a “dangerous hardworking past” (“Coping With Rural Poverty” 898-899). 
These men with acquired disabilities, Sherman deduces, would continue working if work 
were available, so it might be inferred that disability is something reluctantly claimed, 
and that moral capital is only found in it if the disability is claimed as a result of job-
related injuries.  
 However, for the most part, disability is conceptualized as running counter to 
hegemonic masculinity, especially in social settings that place such an emphasis on 
physicality and labor capacity (Shuttleworth et al.). For many, disability is associated 
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with helplessness and dependency, traits which do not meld with working-class 
masculine values such as self-sufficiency and reliability (Shuttleworth et al.). With the 
emphasis on alternative forms of capital that stress morality, disability might contradict 
such standards, if not explicitly, at least implicitly, especially given the historical 
discursive association of disability with immorality and sin, much like the moral worth 
assigned to markers associated with the status of “healthy” or “unhealthy” (Petersen). 
 Finally, Charlesworth claims that the body is the “seat” of working-class identity 
(238). According to Charlesworth, working-class people are “condemned to dexterity 
rather than intelligence,” contributing to this identification with the body (239). Working-
class articulation stems from this relation to the body, revealing much about working-
class identity (Charlesworth). Such an articulatory style reflects straightforwardness, 
strength, and avoidance of censorship or formalities in order to show one’s self as reliable 
and trustworthy (Charlesworth). 
 Thus, we can see that the identity of a “working man” is more complex than it 
might initially appear. These intersections and embedded meanings will be important 
when considering the standpoint and phenomenology of working-class experience. They 
will also be important to my use of critical discourse analysis that seeks to make clear 
embedded meanings and ideologies. 
 
   STANDPOINT AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
 Standpoint theory is broad and varied, but in general, it can be understood as “a 
set of theoretical and epistemological propositions designed to produce alternative 
knowledge” (Kokushkin 10). Dominant forms of knowledge tend to be produced by those 
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with privilege, typically reflecting androcentric and Western interests rather than being 
truly objective (Harding). Dominant knowledge is granted its legitimacy through social 
institutions of power, rendering it legitimated knowledge, and all others subjugated 
knowledge (P.H. Collins). The alternative knowledge standpoint suggests comes from 
“multiple knower-positions . . . [and is] culturally and discursively grounded in 
experience” (10). Alternative knowledge and the concept of multiple knowers allows for 
standpoint to function in opposition to dominant forms of knowledge and to serve the less 
privileged of society (Kokushkin). 
 This alternative knowledge is generated through different points of perceptual 
access (Alcoff; P.H. Collins). In other words, a black woman might have access 
knowledge that a white women does not have access to, or a working-class person might 
have access to knowledge that an upper-class person does not. To some extent, a person’s 
position in society impacts what knowledge they have since knowledge is generated 
through experience. This idea is called epistemic privilege. Alcoff understands social 
positioning as being intertwined with social identity and influential to which knowledge 
is accessible, writing that “identities operate as horizons from which certain aspects or 
layers of reality can be made visible,” making social identity “a rough and fallible but 
useful indicator of differences in perceptual access” (82). Standpoint theory is crucial to 
the topic of the cultural and political divide between white working-class men and the 
educated elite because it holds that experiential knowledge is a legitimate and credible 
source of knowledge. 
 Like standpoint theory, phenomenology emphasizes the importance of situated 
knowledge. I use phenomenology in conjunction with standpoint because 
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phenomenology asserts that knowledge and experience is necessarily embodied 
(Merleau-Ponty). Considering the bodily emphasis of working-class experience, 
phenomenology is especially significant in its focus on a deeper, pre-reflective type of 
knowledge. As Charlesworth explains, “the body thus involves a primordial, pre- 
reflective orientation” that is passed on through what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a 
“postural impregnation” (18). It is “a way of feeling the world which is an aspect of the 
body projecting itself into the world, apprehending significances” (Charlesworth 18). We 
are so much more than vehicles of cognitive experience. Charlesworth maintains that 
 we inhabit the world not merely as perceptual subjects but also as affective 
 beings. For our perceptions are always inhabited by an excess of meaning, 
 originating in the primordial grounds of sense, which is more than sensation and 
 which reveals the world of perception for what it is: the achievement of a body- 
 subject which has a temporal structure enabling it to carry this primitive 
 acquisition of horizons which allows a more determinate world of objects and 
 projects to exist. (18) 
I do not want to get lost in discursive trends and lose sight of the bodily and material 
experiences such discourse attempts to reflect. Kept in focus is the understanding that 
language and the body are so deeply intertwined, and a relation to language and the body 
is at the heart of this cultural and political rift, a rift in which some bodily and linguistic 
comportments and competencies are legitimated while others are not. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant write of this intimate relation and how it pertains to social class: 
 Language is a technique of the body, and linguistic . . . competency is a 
 dimension of bodily hexis in which the whole relation to the social world 
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 expresses itself . . . [This] suggests . . . that the bodily schema characteristic of a 
 social class determines the system of phonological traits that characterize a class 
 pronunciation, via . . . the ‘articulatory style’ . . . a lifestyle that has become 
 embodied . . . (149) 
Thus, I rely on phenomenology and standpoint theory for their material and situated 
focus, and their epistemological positions that consider lived experience and embodiment 
as valid sources of legitimate knowledge and perception.  
 
    EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
 One of the most important concepts I am using in this thesis comes from Miranda 
Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice. She defines epistemic injustice as “a wrong done to 
someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (1). The two main forms of epistemic 
injustice that she identifies are testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. 
According to Fricker, testimonial injustice is caused by prejudices the hearer might hold 
against the speaker resulting in a credibility deficit. In other words, the hearer may have 
conscious or unconscious prejudices against the speaker, usually relating to identity, 
causing them to perceive the speaker as having less credibility. Hermeneutical injustice, 
on the other hand, involves a lack in interpretive resources available for making sense of 
one’s social experiences. Both forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial and 
hermeneutical, are relevant to the topic of the cultural and political gap between the 
working-class and the educated elite.  
 In this project, I am primarily asserting that the educated elite hold prejudices 
against working-class people, specifically working-class white men, causing them to 
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disregard their experiences as lacking credibility despite the very real class oppression 
they face. Of course, this is contextually dependent, and this disregard is reciprocated in 
some ways in instances when a working-class person assumes someone with class 
privilege has no idea what they are talking about. However, this reciprocation does not 
amount to the alienation of an entire group of people; those with class privilege still have 
more social power and influence over collective forms of social understanding. Again, I 
want to be clear, I am not suggesting white working-class men are oppressed due to their 
whiteness or maleness, however, it is not uncommon for critiques of white working-class 
men to verge on being thinly-veiled classism. Disregarding the knowledge and 
experiences of white working-class men in many regards is due to prejudices rooted in 
class and this is an example of testimonial injustice. 
 Hermeneutic injustice is also relevant here. Some groups, according to Fricker, 
experience a disadvantage in making sense of their own social experiences (146). Fricker 
explains that those with “material power . . . will tend to have an influence in those 
practices by which social meaning are generated” (147), meaning that those without 
social and material power also might not have access to the interpretive resources for 
making their social experiences legible. Following the reasoning of hermeneutic injustice, 
this means that working-class people have less influence over collective social meaning 
and less access to interpretive resources for their own social meaning. An example of one 
type of interpretive resource is a legitimated form of speech. For instance, working-class 
people might be rendered silent when faced with a formal linguistic market 
 like the one constituted by a linguistic survey or investigation ... [Popular 
 competence] ... is, as it were, annihilated. The reality of linguistic legitimacy 
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 consists precisely in the fact that dominated individuals are always under the 
 potential jurisdiction of formal law, even when they spend all their lives . . . 
 beyond its reach, so that when placed in a formal situation they are doomed to 
 silence or to the broken discourse which linguistic investigation also often 
 records. (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 71) 
Charlesworth argues that language-use and speech are products of one’s social position or 
condition, and that working-class people speak a delegitimated or devalued form of 
language recognized as slang, which is a “dominated linguistic competence” 
(Charlesworth 139). Charlesworth adds that this relates to a difficulty in political 
representation as well because “the dominant language and . . . the institutions that 
inscribe in bodies the dispositions to speak and perform it . . . conversely, [influence] the 
dispositions to feel its legitimacy and authority” (213). Dominant language is more than 
discursively powerful, it literally shapes bodily dispositions to feel its legitimacy and this 
legitimacy is reified again and again. 
 With this being said, I want to trouble Fricker’s idea of hermeneutic injustice 
slightly. While recognizing the merit of her work on hermeneutic injustice, I am weary of 
any charge of marginalized people being unable to understand their own experiences 
because I am coming from the perspective that lived experience is a legitimate source of 
knowledge and that marginalized people are very capable of understanding their 
experiences. In fact, as Patricia Hill Collins explains, “subordinate groups have long had 
to use alternative ways to create independent self-definitions and self-valuations,” which 
involves “using alternative ways of producing and validating knowledge” (252). 
However, they may struggle to communicate in a way that renders their experiences 
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legible to those not marginalized in the same way. Working-class people are generally at 
least implicitly aware of “the objective hierarchy of habitus and linguistic competence,” 
and that their language is not legitimated by educated bourgeois speech habits 
(Charlesworth 139). So, I differ from Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic injustice in 
that I believe marginalized people understand their experiences even without the same 
access to interpretive resources, they just lack the legitimated knowledge and speech to 
legibly articulate their experiences to those outside their habitus4. Even with my deviation 
from Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic injustice, it is still a type of epistemic 
injustice committed against a marginalized group because they are denied the legitimacy 
and tools needed to be legible to dominant classes and institutions, rendering it “a wrong 
done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (1). 
 
    METHODS FOR ANALYSIS 
 I am employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because my goal is to first 
analyze the texts themselves (Clinton’s speech, Trump’s response ad, Trump’s 
comments, etc.), and then go beyond the texts to consider their institutional and 
sociocultural contexts (Carvalho). Using this method of analysis aids in “expos[ing] the 
causes and consequences of specific discourses and . . . denounce[s] the social, cultural or 
political wrongs which they sustain” (Carvalho 162). CDA’s central claim is that 
                                                        
4 This does not deny the importance of having access to hermeneutic resources. Instead, I am 
acknowledging that there are versions of hermeneutic resources useful for understanding one’s own 
experiences that are either legitimated or subjugated by dominant classes and institutions. Access to 
hermeneutic resources to understand one’s position in the world is important, but in order to be taken as 
having epistemic credibility to those outside their own habitus, there is a certain amount of legibility 
needed. Expanding the types of knowledge and knowers that are valued seeks to grant this legibility and 
epistemic credibility.  
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ideologies are embedded in all discourse, which both constitutes and reifies existing 
institutions of power (Carvalho; Fairclough). CDA as a method is particularly appropriate 
for understanding the political and cultural gap between the working-class and the 
educated elite because it is a method that recognizes that “language is both a site of and a 
stake in class struggle” (Fairclough 35). Thus, paying close attention to the textual 
evidence of the underlying ideologies present in political discourse can be especially 
fruitful for illustrating epistemic injustice, and both recognizing and understanding this 
political and cultural gap. 
 CDA can be approached through a three-tiered method involving description, 
interpretation, and explanation of a given text (Fairclough). Description is used to 
identify the linguistic associations, interpretation involves the pragmatic and intertextual 
elements, and explanation relates to broader socio-cultural conditions (Fairclough). The 
framework for analyzing media discourse with CDA is broken down into two main 
components: textual analysis and contextual analysis (Carvalho). I will elaborate on what 
makes up these two components below.  
 Textual analysis includes a text’s layout and structural organization, objects, 
actors, language, grammar and rhetoric, discursive strategies, and ideological standpoints 
(Carvalho). A text’s layout and structural organization is important for which elements 
will be noticed based off of the organization, impacting how the audience might perceive 
or interpret the issue (Carvalho). Objects are the themes or topics constructed by the text, 
which emphasize the notion that “discourse constitutes rather than just ‘refers to’ the 
realities at stake” (Carvalho 167). Actors are the social agents present or referenced in the 
text. They may be individuals or institutions (Carvalho). Language, grammar and rhetoric 
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refers to word choice or vocabulary, and the writing style (Carvalho). Discursive 
strategies relate to how a text is manipulated or framed to impact audience perception, 
which includes which elements are included and excluded, and how those elements are 
arranged (Carvalho). Finally, ideological standpoints are the implicit and explicit social 
and political values or stances present in a text (Carvalho). 
 Contextual analysis includes comparative-synchronic analysis and historical-
diachronic analysis (Carvalho). Comparative-synchronic analysis involves comparing a 
text to other texts from around the same time that cover the same issue (Carvalho). 
Historical-diachronic analysis, on the other hand, examines the broader political, social, 
and economic context of a text (Carvalho). It also considers the evolution of discourse 
over a period of time (Carvalho). Understanding the historical context for how an issue 
developed over time is valuable for better understanding the present (Carvalho).  
 I will return to these concepts in the following chapter where I apply CDA to 
Hillary Clinton calling half of Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,” Donald 
Trump’s television advertisement responding to Clinton’s comments, and Trump’s 
responding comments in a speech given in Asheville, North Carolina. I have chosen these 
textual examples because they are “critical discourse moments” (Carvalho 173). 
According to Carvalho, such moments challenge established discursive positions and are 
defined through political activity and socially relevant events (166). For now, I 
emphasize my understanding of discourse as “a site of struggle, where forces of social 
(re)production and contestation are played out” (Lazar 4). By analyzing these texts and 
their relation to the cultural and political divide between the working-class and the 
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educated elite, I hope to make clear the overt and subtle presence of the “renderings of 





























CHAPTER 3:  
DEPLORABLE, “HARD WORKING PEOPLE LIKE YOU” 
 
OVERVIEW 
 In this chapter, I use critical discourse analysis to provide a reading of  2016 
Presidential Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s comments describing half of Donald 
Trump's supporters as being a “basket of deplorables,” Trump’s responding comments, 
and Trump’s responding television advertisement. Following Clinton's comments came 
both Far-Right backlash and the reclaiming of the term “deplorable” among Trump's 
supporters. I analyze these textual examples because they are “critical discourse 
moments” of larger discursive chains that help illustrate the concepts and claims I have 
detailed in the previous chapters. The goals of this chapter are to first, summarize the 









 On September 9, 2016, at a private fundraiser, the LGBT for Hillary Gala, 
Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton committed a large gaffe that 
potentially could have cost her the presidency. Before the crowd, standing at a podium 
with the words “Stronger Together” stretching across the front, Clinton made the 
infamously unpopular remark. “We are living in a volatile political environment,” she 
explained to nodding heads in the crowd. She continued, “You know, to just be grossly 
generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of 
deplorables. Right?” She paused as the room filled with laughter and applause. She 
continued again: 
 The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic (sic)— you name it. 
 And unfortunately there are people like that. And he has lifted them up . . . Now, 
 some of those folks — they are irredeemable, but thankfully they are not 
 America. But the other basket . . . of people are people who feel that the 
 government has let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares 
 about them, nobody worries about what happens to their lives and their futures, 
 and they’re just desperate for change. It doesn’t really even matter where it comes 
 from. They don’t buy everything he says, but he seems to hold out some hope that 
 their lives will be different. They won’t wake up and see their jobs disappear, lose 
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 a kid to heroine (sic), feel like they’re in a dead-end. Those are people we have to 
 understand and empathize with as well.5 
The second half of Clinton’s statement perhaps does not get enough attention, but enough 
damage had been done by the first half. She committed the fatal mistake of criticizing the 
voters rather than the opponent. Aside from this error in judgment, what in particular 
makes this statement sting? Further, what discourses do Clinton’s comments derive from 
or refer to that render them so worthy of being recognized as a misstep deserving of the 
label “a political gift,” as Clinton later referred to it in her memoir What Happened 
(413)? 
 Some of Clinton’s supporters might have speculated that the statement was 
received so poorly because it was so perfectly accurate. Or in the very least, it was guilt 
by association; if someone supported a candidate who has demonstrated himself to be a 
racist, sexist, Islamophobic, and xenophobic person, then by extension they would be as 
well. Perhaps it was emphasis on half of Trump’s supporters being deplorable. If almost 
sixty-three million people ended up voting for Trump (Federal Elections Commission), 
did that mean that roughly thirty million Americans would qualify as deplorable in 
Clinton’s mind?  
 The most damaging fact of Clinton’s statement is that it identified individuals as 
deplorable rather than the beliefs or stances that they hold as deplorable. Worse, she was 
not simply describing individuals as “deplorable” by using it as an adjective to describe 
one particular characteristic of a person or group; rather, she used it in the form of a 
noun, suggesting that it is the essence of what these people are (Merriam-Webster). 
                                                        
5 For a full transcript of Clinton’s speech, see Appendix A. 
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Further, she identified them as “irredeemable.” Did Clinton mean to invoke such an 
image of Trump’s supporters? One could only speculate, but what her gaffe certainly 
does is capture the sentiment held by many of the “class blind” educated elite 
(Charlesworth). 
 
TRUMP’S RESPONSE AD 
 The Trump campaign quickly realized the opportunity and seized it with a 30 
second response ad airing in Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida (E. 
Collins). Choosing to air the ad in these states specifically is important considering the 
economic demographics of each state, the presence of a rural population, and finally that 
these states are recognized as swing states with an ability to determine the outcome of the 
presidential election.  
 The ad opens with Clinton standing at the podium, arms stretched outwards while 
a female narrator sets the tone of the ad as emphasizing class, beginning with “speaking 
to wealthy donors . . . ” In an effort to demonstrate the sheer number of people Clinton 
allegedly saw as deplorable, a wide shot of a large crowd at a Trump rally is pictured 
behind the word “deplorable” while the narrator states that “Hillary Clinton called tens of 
millions of Americans deplorable.” In several of the following short frames, diverse 
groups of individuals are shown as Clinton lists off the adjectives “sexist,” 
“homophobic,” “xenophobic,” and “Islamophobic.” The first close shot is of two white 
men in hard hats at a rally, immediately invoking the association of white working-class 
men with the term “deplorable.” A succession of clips feature white women, women of 
color, and veterans respectively while the narrator says “people like you, you, and you—
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deplorable.” The ad concludes with the narrator asking “you know what’s deplorable?” as 
the words appear before an image of Clinton, and the narrator answers “Hillary Clinton 
viciously demonizing hard-working people like you.” 
 
TRUMP’S RESPONDING COMMENTS 
 On September 13, 2016, a couple of days after Clinton made her initial comments, 
during a rally in Asheville, North Carolina, Trump responded to Clinton’s remarks. 
 While my opponent slanders you as deplorable and irredeemable, I call you hard-
 working American patriots who love your country and want a better future for all 
 of our people. You are mothers and fathers, soldiers and sailors, carpenters and 
 welders. You are Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Above all else, you 
 are Americans – and you are entitled to leadership that honors you, cherishes you, 
 and defends you. Every American is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect 
 in our country . . . [Our supporters are] united by their deep and sophisticated 
 understanding of how our political system has abandoned the people . . . Hillary 
 Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans. She 
 looks down on them . . . on all the people who make her life possible . . . the 
 carpenters, plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants . . . the police officers, 
 soldiers, and firefighters supporting our campaign . . . people who cook her meals, 
 drive her cars, and dig the coal that powers her electricity. She called these 
 Americans every name in the book -- racist, sexist, xenophobic, Islamophobic -- 
 she said they were not even American.6 
                                                        
6 For Donald Trump’s full speech in response, please refer to Appendix B 
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Trump’s response seized the opportunity to further cement the association of Clinton’s 
“basket of deplorables” comment with the working-class. 
 
     ANALYSIS 
 Referring back to the major tenets of critical discourse analysis, I would like to 
analyze Hillary Clinton’s words alongside the Trump response ad and his responding 
comments. To do so, I turn my attention to the features of textual analysis, which include 
a text’s layout and structural organization, objects, actors, language, grammar and 
rhetoric, discursive strategies, and ideological standpoints, and contextual analysis, which 
includes comparative-synchronic analysis and historical-diachronic analysis (Carvalho). 
 
LAYOUT, OBJECTS, AND ACTORS 
 The three texts can be described according to general elements such as the layout, 
objects, and actors. A text’s layout and structural organization is concerned with which 
elements will be noticed based off of the organization, thus impacting how the audience 
might perceive or interpret the issues at hand (Carvalho). Objects are themes or topics 
constructed by the text, emphasizing the idea that “discourse constitutes rather than just 
‘refers to’ the realities at stake” (Carvalho 167). Objects are constructed by Clinton’s 
statement, Trump’s responding comments, and his response ad. Actors are the social 
agents, including individuals or institutions, that are presented or referenced in the text 
(Carvalho).  
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 Clinton’s speech at the LGBT for Hillary Gala is primarily organized to compare 
and contrast herself to her opponent. She does this through the theme of LGBT rights and 
discussing issues that she considers most pressing to the LGBT community. Another 
theme is that of urgency and perseverance, repeating phrases like “we know what we are 
up against” or “there are only 60 days left to make our case.” There is also the theme of 
caution for the future if she is not elected president, with her hyperbolically claiming that 
she is “all that stands between us and the apocalypse.” The themes and social agents most 
remembered from this speech, however, are the two “baskets” that Trump’s supporters 
can be divided into; the “basket of deplorables,” and those who feel let down by the 
economy and government. Thus, a final notable theme is of the dangers Trump’s 
supporters present for the future of the country. 
 Trump’s responding comments are similarly organized in a manner that compares 
and contrasts him to his opponent. Although he focuses on themes relating to the moral 
dignity, honor, and respect that all Americans are deserving of. He does this by appealing 
to institutions such as the family and military, as well as the working-class, saying “[you] 
are mothers and fathers, soldiers and sailors, carpenters and welders.” He also does this 
by empathizing with the those who have lost their jobs and by recognizing individuals in 
a number of occupations, particularly those with blue-collar jobs. A major theme he relies 
on is the interests of “the people,” ordinary people. In fact, in his short speech, he refers 
to “the people” in this way six times. While referring to “the people” he also makes a 
firm distinction between the interests of common people and the interests of the wealthy 
and corrupt elite of Washington, the group he depicts Clinton as belonging to. He 
simultaneously appeals to the moral dignity of the working-class, claiming that he “will 
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be their champion,” while stressing that Clinton “looks down” on all of the working-class 
people “who make her life possible.” Through doing this, he is intentionally initiating 
himself, marking himself as one of them, and Clinton as the opposite, an aloof and 
clueless elite insider. 
 Finally, multiple elements in Trump’s response ad are organized in such a way so 
as to emphasize key ideas to influence the audience’s perception of Hillary Clinton and 
her initial statement. Important to the layout of the ad is that it begins by establishing a 
class-related tone and theme in acknowledging that Clinton’s words were spoken to 
“wealthy donors” at a fundraiser, and it concludes with the words “Hillary Clinton 
viciously demonizing hard working people like you,” both appearing and being spoken 
aloud. The use of a wide shot with a large crowd and the word “DEPLORABLE” 
appearing and stretching across the frame, followed by multiple close shots of different 
groups, changing with each critical epithet Clinton uses, is intended to convince the 
audience that Clinton has insulted a wide array of people, and importantly, morally good 
people. The ad references Hillary Clinton and wealthy people, but also women, working-
class men, veterans, and to some extent, people of color. Thus, a theme of diversity is 
arguably present or at least implied.  
 
LANGUAGE, GRAMMAR, RHETORIC, AND DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES 
 I am combining the categories of language, grammar, and rhetoric with discursive 
strategies because it is difficult to separate these interconnected concepts that are so 
deeply interpellated with one another. Language, grammar, and rhetoric refers to the 
vocabulary and writing style present in a text (Carvalho). Discursive strategies refer to 
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manipulation or framing of the text which involves not only what is included, but also 
what is excluded (Carvalho).  
 The rhetorical choices in language and vocabulary are particularly interesting 
between Clinton’s statement and Trump’s responding comments and ad. The two 
campaigns demonstrate through these texts a clear difference in the intended audience by 
resting on distinct variations in the relation to language. For example, like previously 
mentioned, the word “deplorable” is itself important in that it is not an example of typical 
working-class speech, especially in the peculiar noun form in which Clinton used it 
(Merriam-Webster). It was not uncommon for liberals and progressives to actually joke 
about how a number of people for whom the term was intended probably had to first look 
it up. Online searches for the meaning of the word “deplorable,” an adjective meaning 
“lamentable” or “deserving of censure or contempt,” did in fact spike considerably 
following Clinton’s use of it (Merriam-Webster). Likewise, Clinton resorts to a laundry-
list of terms, “racist,” “sexist,” “homophobic,” “xenophobic,” and “Islamophobic,” 
recognized as “political correctness” on the Right, and emblematic of a Leftist relation to 
language in the reliance upon sophisticated, intellectual, and theoretical “signifying 
terminology” (Proudman 201). Such terminology, Proudman states, allows for groups to 
recognize one another through the signifying act of mutual intellectual belonging, 
 by implying a shared intelligence, by dropping the name of a textual authority, or 
 by deploying thick, intellectually laden, heavily allusive terminology . . . at once 
 to signal allies that ‘we’ really understand what is going on and to exclude and 
 stigmatize opponents who do not know or do not accept the ideological 
 implications of the language in use. The use of such . . . terminology designates as 
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 respectable, and thus inside the group in question, those able to participate in the 
 discussion, while simultaneously excluding those outside the cognoscenti. (203) 
This sense of belonging is further demonstrated in Clinton’s informal use of “you name 
it” following the list of condemning epithets. It might also suggest that, as the in-group 
discussing all of these negative traits, she is speaking to those who are on the same page 
as her, that this terminology is common between them, and none of these terms apply to 
anyone within this group, only to those outside of it.  
 The terms that she uses to describe the “basket of deplorables” are also important 
in that they take on the form of a list. According to Norman Fairclough, in his 
monumental work Language and Power, lists are important in that they set up an 
association between each of the items listed, but do not necessarily explicitly state how 
they are associated. Additionally, what is not included in a list is significant because it 
constructs a notion of what is to be disassociated. Listing pulls in the audience and 
requires work on their part to follow the speaker’s line of reasoning. Notably, what is 
missing from Clinton’s list is any term referencing class, despite having listed terms that 
are easily understood to be in reference to race, gender, sexuality, national origin, and 
religion (specifically Islam). Implicitly, this inclusion and exclusion of terms listed might 
account for why it was perceived that Clinton was denigrating working-class people 
specifically as a “basket of deplorables.” Trump similarly uses lists in his responding 
comments, but ones that are more blatantly associated with the working-class—through 
the naming of working-class occupations: 
 Hillary Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans. 
 She looks down on . . . the people who make her life possible . . . the carpenters, 
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 plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants. . . the police officers, soldiers, 
 and firefighters . . . the people who cook her meals, drive her cars, and dig the 
 coal that powers her electricity. 
Although lawyers and even some accountants might not be generally thought of as 
working-class, every other profession he names in this speech is coded as stereotypically 
working-class. 
 While Trump’s response ad relies on a different relationship to language, it is 
similar to Clinton’s speech in its attempts to articulate relationality and belonging, 
particularly emphasizing the invocation of the pronoun “you.” Fairclough identifies the 
significance and prominence of the direct address of individuals through the use of the 
pronoun “you” in its ability to convey relational intimacy and connection with the 
intended audience. “You” is “used to register solidarity and commonality of experience 
in working-class speech” (Fairclough 180). According to Fairclough, because of the 
“diverse . . . composition of mass-media audiences, the speaker . . . has to postulate, and 
set up a subject position for . . . a typified ‘ideal’ hearer” (178). In his analysis of another 
authoritarian populist, Margaret Thatcher, he determines her ideal hearer to be an 
“ordinary person” or a member of “the people” (179). Thus, Thatcher’s use of the 
pronoun “you,” in speaking to the experiences, beliefs, and aspirations of “the people,” 
establishes a relationship which places herself in with “the ordinary person” as well 
(179). Similarly, the use of “you” in Trump’s response ad attempts to establish solidarity 
and a relationship between Trump himself and the ideal hearer whom Clinton has 
insulted, serving the double function of presenting Trump as “one of the people” and, 
conversely, Clinton as a member of the wealthy elite. Interestingly, in one of the final 
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frames of the consecutive deployment of “you” in Trump’s ad, he is himself featured 
distributing supplies to flood victims alongside Mike Pence, as fellow members of “the 
people,” whom, it is suggested, Clinton has called “deplorable.”  
 In addition to bringing attention to a collective solidarity among those who are 
presumably “deplorable,” “you” may also function in the singular form, drawing in 
individual viewers. Fairclough refers to this quality as “synthetic personalization,” or a 
“compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of the people ‘handled’ 
en masse as an individual” (52). This is especially significant in this context because it 
tugs on the very personal issue of feeling disempowered politically. Charlesworth 
explains that oftentimes working-class people feel alienated from politics, because they 
“cannot recognize their plight in the discourses supplied by politicians” (212). Working-
class people may feel that their experiential knowledge does not qualify as “politics” 
because, to them, their experiences are just ordinary life (Charlesworth). Because they 
lack the legitimated linguistics and articulatory comportment associated with expression 
in the political domain, and because they have internalized the feelings of incompetence, 
they might ignore the political realm all together (Charlesworth). But for political 
representation to materialize, their “corporeal sense of the world” depends upon a “self-
conscious representation of their interests” (212). This invocation of the individualizing 
“you,” paired with the corporeal “hard working people” in the ad’s clause “hard working 
people like you,” provides this transition from a working-class corporeal sense of the 
world to a literal self-conscious representation of their interests. Thus, such an invocation 
of “you” provides the political efficacy that working-class people have historically felt 
they have lacked or been denied by dominant institutions and the dominant class. 
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 Trump’s responding comments also play on the usage of “you” and specifically 
rely on the invocation of “the people,” like previously mentioned. Comparing his 
responding comments to Clinton’s initial speech, his delivery is more direct in that he 
more frequently directly addresses the audience as “you,” while Clinton is more likely to 
say “I” or “we.” In several cases where she does use “you,” it could easily be replaced 
with the impersonal “one,” whose relational value can be a euphemistic way of saying 
“I,” which can be interpreted as “a delicate way of stating a self-centered perception of 
interests” (for example, “you could put half of his supporters into . . . the basket of 
deplorables” easily can be “one could put . . . ” or “I could put . . . ”) (Fairclough 180). 
Trump’s comments on the other hand are more direct; “I want to tell you what I am going 
to do to make your life better,” or “I call you hardworking American patriots who love 
your country.” In the same speech, he says that Clinton “talks about people like they're 
objects, not human beings.” In the sense that her language, in comparison to his, can 
more easily be read as hypothetical rather than personal and direct, this claim is not 
unfounded. 
 Lastly, what is worth noting are the portions of Clinton’s initial statement which 
are included in Trump’s response ad in comparison to which portions are excluded. What 
should be immediately obvious for anyone who has read or listened to Clinton’s full 
statement is that a large portion of it is excluded from the response ad put out by Trump’s 
campaign. After all, she refers to Trump’s supporters fitting into two baskets. The “basket 
of deplorables” has received plenty of attention, but its counterpart, “the other basket,” 
including those who feel alienated and forgotten by their government, who have 
legitimate concerns, and are deserving of empathy—that basket has not received the same 
 59 
attention. This other portion was also rarely acknowledged by media coverage and 
political commentary on the incident. This is a very deliberate example of framing by 
what is included and what is excluded. While Trump does acknowledge both “baskets” in 
his responding comments in Asheville, North Carolina, the content to be shared in 
multiple commercial airings across Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida 
included only the “basket of deplorables,” not the other basket of people whom Clinton 
called on her supporters to empathize with (E. Collins). 
 
IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS 
 Multiple ideological standpoints are present in Clinton’s speech, Trump’s 
responding comments, and his response ad. Some are quite overt while others are more 
subtle. In discussing the ideological standpoints, I will jump between the three texts I am 
analyzing because they are contextually tied to one another. According to Carvalho, 
ideological standpoints are the implicit and explicit social and political values or stances 
present in a text. Ideological standpoints take on the quality of an assumption which 
functions as “a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power . . 
. through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations 
and power differences for granted” (Fairclough 2). This is not an exhaustive account of 
every ideology present in these texts because not every ideology readily pertains to the 
topic of this thesis. What I do provide is an overview of several of the primary ideologies 
present which are at the heart of the issue of epistemic injustice. These important 
ideologies include, on one hand, a neoliberal and meritocratic emphasis on hard work, 
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morality, dignity, and honor, traits we will see coded as white and masculine, and on the 
other, elitism and the idea that working-class people are ignorant. 
 First, some general ideologies present in Clinton’s initial comments: Clinton’s 
speech emphasizes rights-based ideologies for LGBT people and social justice ideologies 
interested in women’s rights, civil rights, racial equality, multi-culturalism, pro-
immigration, and even to a lesser degree, support for the military. While her critique of 
those who would belong in “the basket of deplorables” was probably directed towards 
white-supremacists and the alt-right who have been emboldened by Trump’s rhetoric, its 
intertextual reference to negative discourse regarding the stereotypically ignorant, 
bigoted, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, white working-class man 
is implicitly present.   
 Trump does attempt to shed the racist label in his response ad and in his 
responding comments. In his ad, diverse groups of people are shown including Latinx 
people, a black man, an Orthodox Jewish man, and otherwise racially ambiguous people, 
suggesting that more than just “racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic,” 
white, working-class men support him. In his responding comments in Asheville, North 
Carolina, he talks about people of color, specifically referring to a statistic on African-
American poverty rates. Although he does so immediately after mentioning his plans for 
reforming “inner cities.” Then he follows up with a statistic on gun violence in Chicago. 
His general message to black Americans is that, in urban areas, Democrats have been in 
power for decades and that their lives are not necessarily any better for it. Because they 
have nothing to lose, they should vote for Trump.  
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 Clearly, there are some issues here with conflating inner cities with blackness, 
poverty, and violence, associations Trump has been criticized for invoking multiple 
times, both during his campaign and continuing into his presidency (Ye Hee Lee). 
However, the placement of his appeal to black Americans is interesting in its implicit 
embedding of gendered and raced ideas. The phrase “hard working people” is used in 
both Trump’s response ad and responding comments. To refer back to the intersecting 
axes of identity and “the working man,” Roediger argues that the term “working man” 
invokes an implicit whiteness and sense of masculinity. Keeping this in mind, the 
repeated phrase “hard working people” in Trump’s responding ad and comments could be 
coded as white and masculine, implicitly subscribing to an ideology of white people 
working hard and people of color being lazy. It is curious that throughout Trump’s 
speech on the dignity of hard working Americans, he partitions his statements to the 
black community, imploring them to “Give Donald J. Trump a chance,” off in a short 
section near the end of his speech, separate from talk of dignity and hard work. Nowhere 
else in his speech does he mention people of color. This type of distancing, while 
implicit, furthers an ideological standpoint that understands morality, goodness, and 
forms of respectable masculinity as being traits associated with whiteness, and if read 
through Roediger’s point, this whiteness implies maleness. 
 Trump’s response ad and responding comments contain a heavy reliance on the 
narrative of being hard working, which is a powerful ideological standpoint that 
influences Trump’s appeal to working-class people. Sociologists have suggested that 
working-class people develop their self-worth in moral terms (Lamont; Sherman). With 
obstacles preventing upward mobility, working-class people find value in moral order 
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derived from hard work, paying bills and taxes, caring for their children, and caring for 
others (Lamont et al.; Pini and Conway; Sherman). These duties are traits of the 
“disciplined self,” embraced by white working-class men and many working-class men of 
color (Lamont). Through the lens of the “disciplined self,” value is manifested through 
meritocratic ideals of “hard work and commitment, upholding family responsibilities, and 
performing the role of the provider and protector” (Lamont et al. S162). Of particular 
salience is the association of hard working people with moral dignity, an association 
rooted in discourses of meritocracy. For example, after surveying seventy-three of 
Trump’s formal speeches on the 2016 campaign trail, Lamont, Yun Park, and Ayala-
Hurtado identified that Trump appealed to the white working-class by raising their moral 
status through repeatedly describing them as hardworking, and acknowledging their 
concerns about professionals, the elite, and politicians, among a number of things. We 
can see that Trump’s response ad is in alignment with their assessment, as are his 
responding comments to Clinton’s initial statement. 
 Different categories of individuals representing moral goodness are depicted 
throughout the ad including veterans, working-class people, and Trump, as he is seen 
helping victims of a natural disaster. It is clear that invoking an ideology of morality is 
important to this ad and perceived as important to the intended audience of the ad. This 
point is made even more explicit by Trump’s responding comments made in Asheville, 
North Carolina. In this brief speech, Trump says the words “respect,” “dignity,” or 
“honor” eight times, he says “jobs” ten times, and he says “work” or “working” five 
times, including the phrase “hard working” or “working hard.” The prominence and 
frequency of these words effectively establish the perspective that Clinton’s comment 
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was in reference to hardworking members of the working-class. With the association of 
hard work with virtue and dignity, one can only wonder where this leaves those who are 
physically disabled or unable to work for other reasons. 
 For those that belong in Clinton’s proverbial “other basket,” those who feel let 
down and forgotten by the government and by the economy, and as Trump summarized 
in his responding comments, as “having run out of options,” they are deserving of 
empathy according to Clinton. However, as William’s articulates, empathy is often 
perceived as condescension. This attempt of showing a kinder sentiment towards those in 
“the other basket” could be interpreted not as empathy, but as pity and insulting the 
intelligence of the white working-class individuals supporting Trump. White working-
class people are not privy to pity, and Trump capitalized on this fact by returning to the 
rhetoric of hard work, dignity, and honor. Between pity and being irredeemably 
deplorable, there is no difference except in that rejecting pity is more dignified. 
 In Trump’s responding comments, he acknowledges the knowledge and 
understanding that the working-class has of the country’s political workings. He even 
flatters them, calling their understanding “sophisticated”: 
 Whether our supporters have lost a job to a factory moved to another country, or 
 whether they’re a captain in the police department, or a teacher at a local school, 
 they are united by their deep and sophisticated understanding of how our political 
 system has abandoned the people. 
By calling the understanding of individuals in these professions “sophisticated,” and 
repeatedly claiming that Clinton “looks down on them,” he is deliberately playing right 
into the narrative, made even more opportunistically accessible by Clinton’s ill-advised 
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comments, that the educated elite think that working-class people are ignorant, a narrative 
which feeds the process of epistemic injustice. When the white working-class see 
themselves through the eyes of the dominant class; when their perceptual horizon is 
expanded and they have access to the hermeneutic resources to see themselves as an 
object7, to see themselves as deplorable, and to face the condescension and derision, they 
come to imbue  
 a sense of themselves that they must live up against: a fracturing, damaging sense 
 of self learnt through . . . the institutions . . . [and] interactions of everyday life’       
 . . . [inscribing] a . . . sense of the social order that makes visible the extent to 
 which:  ‘Social divisions become principles of division, organizing the image of 
 the social world’ . . . ‘Objective limits acquired by experience of objective limits’ 
 amount to a ‘sense of one’s place’ . . . [leading one] to exclude themselves from 
 [that] . . . which they are excluded. (Charlesworth 248) 
Put simply, after seeing themselves the way the educated elite see them, they elect to 
exclude themselves from a domain which, by their interpretation, they are already 
excluded. If Clinton did not want their vote, then she would not get their vote, essentially. 
The action of excluding themselves from what they have already been excluded from is 
an example of how the social and political division between the white working-class and 
the educated elite actually reifies itself. While Trump appealed to the white working-class 
by appearing to raise up their situated knowledge as legitimate, Clinton either saw them 
                                                        
7 Here, I am referring to Linda Martín Alcoff’s notion of identity as horizon and a matter of perceptual 
access, which I think complements Miranda Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic epistemic injustice, in 
which the knower does not have full access to or a contextualizing understanding of one’s social 
positioning due to a lack in hermeneutical resources. My use of “object” is in the Heideggerian sense, to 
objectify one’s self and attempt to reflexively make sense of things, to “'throw themselves against' a pure 
discovering - that is, that they can become 'objects'” (414). 
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as deplorable or to be pitied, as far as they were concerned. This was the dignity in 
embracing the title “deplorable.” 
 
DISCUSSION 
 It is important to consider the target audiences and contexts for both of the 
candidates. Clinton was speaking to private donors who were presumably liberal. Trump, 
on the other hand, was speaking directly to working-class people because it was that 
demographic who was perceived to be targeted by Clinton’s remarks. Rhetorical 
strategies that are effective for one audience are not necessarily effective for the other. 
One example of this is Trump’s use of extensive boundary work (Lamont et al.). 
Boundary work “feeds hierarchies of worth and status as individuals create 
categorizations and distinctions between people” (S161). These symbolic boundaries 
contribute to the construction of social boundaries (Lamont et al.). Trump employs 
boundary work through his rhetoric, associating himself with working-class people and 
separating himself from the establishment, which he has described as corrupt (Lamont et 
al.). By focusing on the working-class, attributing working-class downward mobility to 
structural factors, and drawing distinct boundaries between both those above and those 
below, Trump effectively catered to what resonates most with the white working-class 
(Lamont et al.). In fact, his boundary work actually mirrored that of white working-class 
men, who develop what Lamont calls a “moral matrix,” to help “maximize their worth in 
relation to ‘people above’ and ‘people below’” (Lamont et al. S162). Thus, Trump’s 
boundary work symbolically bridged the gap between a wealthy businessman like 
himself and white working-class people (Lamont et al.).  
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 Jonathan Haidt presents an interesting assessment in the differences between 
liberal and conservative politics through the use of political psychology and moral 
foundations theory. Moral foundations theory claims that people think and make 
decisions that are based in ideas of morality rather than reason (Haidt). So, with that 
being said, Haidt argues that people make political decisions based on intuition. People 
do reason, but often times they reach a conclusion first, and then develop the arguments 
to justify that conclusion after the fact (Haidt). Haidt considers how morality varies 
across cultures, but there are some themes that tend to recur. These themes of morality 
include care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty8 (Haidt). Haidt argues that 
Liberals tend to construct morality with only three of these foundational themes, mainly 
the theme of care, and also the themes of fairness and liberty. In comparison, 
Conservatives derive their morality from all six themes (Haidt). 
 I mention Lamont’s research on the boundary work in Trump’s speeches and 
Haidt’s work on the foundations of conservative and liberal morality to suggest that 
Trump and Clinton’s audiences, in the contexts I have analyzed, differ, and the 
candidate's rhetorical approaches that are successful with each audience also differ. 
Trump could afford to mirror the boundary work of white working-class men, and this 
approach was beneficial for attracting the support of his intended audience. Clinton’s 
engagement in distinguishing between good and evil baskets of Trump supporters, on the 
other hand, was perceived as “divisive.” Furthermore, the gap that Clinton had to bridge 
                                                        
8 Haidt elaborates on each of these recurrent themes, explaining that care, and its opposite, harm, are 
associated with virtues like kindness or nurturance. Fairness and its opposite, cheating, relate to reciprocal 
altruism and proportionality. Loyalty, and its opposite, betrayal, are associated with patriotism or self-
sacrifice for the group. Authority, and its opposite, subversion, are associated with leadership, followership, 
deference to legitimate authority, and respect for tradition. Sanctity, and its opposite, degradation refer to 
efforts to live in a noble way and protect the body and mind from perceived contaminants. Liberty, and its 
opposite, oppression, involve how people resent or react to those who oppress them or limit their liberty. 
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in her rhetoric, in order to appeal to white working-class men, was much larger than for 
Trump if we consider Haidt’s moral foundations. Were Clinton’s remarks successful in 
any way? Most likely, no. Because Clinton’s remarks influenced a larger shift in 
undecided voters to support Trump in the final stretch, it is clear that her comments were 
not well received outside of her own intended audience of liberal, LGBT private donors 
(Hessan). While the comment might have had some mobilizing potential for the 
Democratic Party, it ultimately deterred undecided voters and solidified white working-
class support for Trump. 
 Why are Trump’s words received as genuine rather than condescending by his 
intended audience of working-class people? In some cases, calling someone’s 
understanding of something “sophisticated” could be perceived as condescending.
Describing something in relation to the working-class as “sophisticated” could in itself 
seem ingenuine due to that kind of language rarely being used to describe the working-
class. The reason for this difference in the way Trump’s words are received compared to 
Clinton’s again can be traced back to a classed difference in relation to language, so 
deeply imbedded in working-class comportment that it influences the affective senses9 
that interpret things such as honesty; interpretations shaped through their habitus and 
socialization, shaping the mind and body that is perceiving, and thus shaping their 
surrounding social environments as well (Distinction, Bourdieu; Charlesworth). More 
specifically, these learned dispositions emphasize the association of honesty, sincerity, 
and trustworthiness with outspokenness, bluntness, the refusal to euphemism-laden 
                                                        
9 This is a phenomenological idea, if we recall that “Language is a technique of the body, and linguistic . . . 
competency is a dimension of bodily hexis in which the whole relation to the social world expresses itself” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 149). 
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speech, and the eschewal of proper etiquette as defined by the dominant classes and 
institutions (Charlesworth). Bourdieu explains it well, stating that  
 it is the free-speech and language of the heart which make the true ‘nice guy’, 
 blunt, straightforward, unbending, honest, genuine, ‘straight down the line,’ . . . as 
 opposed to everything that is pure form, done only for form’s sake; it is freedom 
 and the refusal of complications, as opposed to respect for all the forms and 
 formalities spontaneously perceived as instruments of distinction and power. On . 
 . . these world views, there is no neutral view-point; what for some is shameless 
 and slovenly, for others is straightforward, unpretentious; familiarity is for some 
 the most absolute form of recognition, . . . a trusting openness, a relation of equal 
 to equal. (Distinction 199) 
These improper qualities suggest that Trump is “one who can be known and thus relied 
upon to take a certain stance” (234). Because he had already established himself as the 
outspoken candidate who was not afraid to offend, his words were received by working-
class people as genuine and therefore not condescending. 
 Clinton, on the other hand, represents the image that the Democratic Party has 
attempted to procure for itself: progressive and inclusive to those marginalized due to 
their race, gender, or sexuality. Regardless of how accurately this image depicts reality, it 
is an image that does not include white working-class men (Reich). The Democratic Party 
that was once recognized as the party of working-class people has eroded along with the 
labor unions that helped sustain it over the last three decades, with both Democrat and 
Republican leaders embracing neoliberal policies (Reich). Thus, Clinton came to 
symbolize the increasingly villainized “political correctness,” whose “hyper-correction” 
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was read by many white working-class men as untrustworthy (Charlesworth 226). 
 Charlesworth mentions that working-class people “tellingly equate” these bodily 
and linguistic comportments of propriety with teachers, librarians, city council members, 
government employees, state officials, and politicians (216). These occupations are all 
associated with epistemic authority granted through the nominating power of government 
and education, the social institutions of legitimate knowledge (P.H. Collins). They are 
also associated with the public sector, which has lost favor with the conservative 
movement through what Cramer calls a “rural resentment of public employees,” due to 
the prevailing myths that associate public employees with urban areas or urban concerns, 
and suggest that public employees make more money than they deserve (127). Of course, 
regardless of the accuracy of this assessment of public employees, these negative beliefs 
about the public sector serve a political purpose, promoting privatization (Cramer). 
Cramer also notes an aversion to “university types,” because of the belief that they are 
not hard working people, as well as the rural perception that university employees, 
especially professors, are associated with what is urban and, thus, must look down on 
rural people (131).  
 Cramer acknowledges that these rural and conservative perceptions are, in part, 
due to “an aversion to elitism” (131). However, while Cramer identifies these political 
divisions as primarily being due to the urban and rural divide, I think they can also be 
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linked to an epistemic divide10. Continued subjugation of working-class knowledge is a 
contributing factor in the backlash of what some can only see as “anti-intellectualism,” 
but to call it that misses the point. It is a reaction to having one’s experiences and 
knowledge rendered irrelevant, having one’s thoughts “suppressed by prevailing 
knowledge validation processes,” and the determining that one’s knowledge is not 
legitimate, but rather, subjugated knowledge (P.H. Collins 254). Recourse to insulting the 
intelligence of white working-class men functions to reify institutional powers with the 
authority to determine a hierarchy of knowledge, and a hierarchy of whose standpoints 
count as valid. The implications stretch so far as to even call into question one’s human 








                                                        
10 This is in reference to Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice, and as I further explain, Patricia 
Hill Collins’s concepts of legitimated and subjugated knowledges, intrinsic to her construction of a new 
kind of epistemology, one she identifies as a black feminist standpoint, that includes valuing the meaning 
derived from concrete experience, the ethics of care, and the ethics of personal accountability. It is an 
epistemology that challenges the dominant epistemology (created by elite white men) that renders the 
experiential knowledge of marginalized groups illegitimate. This standpoint epistemology proposes that 
there are multiple standpoints formed from multiple points of situated knowledge, each acknowledging 
their access to a partial truth, and the importance of recognizing the partial perspectives in others which are 
necessary for piecing together the whole (P.H. Collins 270). 
11 Fricker describes epistemic injustice as being “wronged in one’s capacity as a knower [which] is to be 
wronged in a capacity essential to human value . . . [bearing] a social meaning to the effect that the subject 

















 In this final chapter, I discuss the broader implications of epistemic injustice and 
the gap between the white working-class and the educated elite, as well as what is at 
stake in the present political moment as it pertains to the epistemic injustice of white 
working-class men. I suggest some strategies for moving forward and addressing this 
political and cultural rift, and I discuss ideas for future research on this topic. 
 
WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
 In the current political milieu, society is even more stratified and divided than 
ever before. With growing income inequality, the gap between the rich and the poor (and 
the working poor and working-class) is growing ever wider. Likewise, political stances at 
this time feel more polarized than ever—grid locks, government shutdowns, and failures 
to make progress on important legislature and policy confirms this (Thomsen). The 
carnage of the 2016 presidential election cycle does as well.  
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 Donald Trump capitalized on a slew of anxieties made from an amalgamation of 
economic problems, worries over immigration, racial tension, and more, but he also 
tapped into a wound inflicted by a history of class domination manifesting through 
classism and elitism. It is a classism that utilizes ableist rhetoric to suggest that white 
working-class men are too stupid to know what they are talking about. Betsy Leondar-
Wright reminds progressives that if they want to understand Trump voters and, more 
importantly, if they want to change them, the first place to start is by acknowledging that 
they are “sane people of normal intelligence who hold a different ideology.” 
Pathologizing and insulting the intelligence of those with whom one disagrees is not a 
recipe for progress. There will be people who will not change, confirmation bias is hard 
to avoid. There will be people filled with hate, and for some it is not safe to try and 
change the mind of a Trump voter. This is understandable. But for those in positions of 
epistemic authority, those with class privilege or white privilege, these positions of 
institutional power must be used in a class-sensitive manner to reach individuals who 
have been alienated from progressive politics, that is, if progressives want to see a change 
in today’s political climate. 
 Hochschild voices the need to tear down empathy walls and create empathy 
bridges, and Williams, recognizing that empathy might be felt as condescension, 
maintains that we still need to try. This involves academics and intellectuals recognizing 
the class-biases that their work as academics and actions as people help to uphold. It 
involves making a conscious effort to be critical of one’s self. This involves academics 
and intellectuals taking inventory of their political and academic beliefs and asking 
themselves if they are demonstrating a stance based off of obligation for the sake of a 
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professional identity, or if they whole-heartedly care about inclusion. They will need to 
think about who they are still excluding. This requires recognizing that people are all at 
different places in their learning and that so many people are not “irredeemable.”  
 If progressives truly do want to bring about social justice for everyone, regardless 
of their gender, sex, sexuality, race, country of origin, ability, religion, or class, then this 
requires class-sensitive approaches in their social, political, and personal lives, as well as 
class-sensitive pedagogies in the classroom. This also requires valuing concrete 
experiences and recognizing the importance in developing an ethics of care and personal 
accountability (P.H. Collins). In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss some of 
these class-sensitive approaches, the ethics of care and personal accountability, and future 
directions for research in this area of study. 
 
A WAY FORWARD? 
 To be “class-sensitive” is to take part in “thought and action grounded in the goal 
of eliminating classism and class bias of all kinds” (Jones and Vagle 130). Describing 
class-sensitive pedagogy, Stephanie Jones and Mark Vagle explain that it is  
 not necessarily about taking up a particular orientation toward the world, but 
 more about acquiring bodied habits of “judging” our judgments so they do not 
 continually take hold of us . . . and lead us to making classed reactionary 
 comments—and speaking out with urgency in solidarity (not sympathy or pity or 
 hatred) with working-class and poor students. It is about acquiring and sharing 
 ever-widening knowledge about history and contemporary issues facing families 
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 struggling to survive and acting with great humility to hear a personal story that 
 may contradict all of the knowledge learned in books. (138)  
What is interesting about this description of class-sensitive pedagogy is its emphasis on 
bodied knowledge and ultimately being about acquiring bodied habits of being critical of 
our own judgments. This description acknowledges both the validity of the knowledge of 
personal, embodied experience, and “the knowledge learned in books,” as well as how 
both of these knowledges are simultaneously constitutive of and constituted by social life 
(138). These bodied habits help in the development of “class-sensitive perceptivity” 
(135). Class-sensitive perceptivity is important for both pedagogues and people in 
general. Jones and Vagle explain that this perceptivity involves continually developing an 
attunement to moment-to-moment interactions, noting the ways in which spaces are 
classed, and recognizing how our bodies exist within these classed spaces in order to 
transform “perceived, embodied classism” (135). 
 For intellectuals and academics, particularly those in gender and sexuality studies 
or who espouse feminist stances in their work, classroom, or institutions, it is particularly 
imperative to consider how one conceives of those with whom they disagree or how one 
interacts with those who do not know the nuanced ways of navigating politically correct 
speech. This involves recognizing, as Rosalind Coward asserts, that not every critique of 
masculinity is necessarily progressive, noting that, so often, working-class men 
disproportionately shoulder the burden of every negative masculine trait or behavior, 
while men from the middle and upper-classes, who also benefit from male dominance, 
and are often just as guilty of similar behaviors, are able to escape the same level of 
criticism. One reason for this is that men with class privilege are more likely to have 
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access to euphemistic forms of language that render their speech more socially 
acceptable, and their sexism more covert (Charlesworth). However, this double standard 
is ultimately classist in nature and, as Coward argues, perpetuated by a “quasi-feminist 
critique of masculinity” (Quoted in Charlesworth 156). While many aspects of 
masculinity are worthy of disparagement, Coward maintains, it becomes problematic 
when paired with hostility towards the underclasses and underprivileged, or in other 
words, when “the disparagement of all things male is linked to the poor” (Quoted in 
Charlesworth 156).  
 This quasi-feminist critique of masculinity has penetrated academic culture 
(Charlesworth 161). Thus, while the increased role feminism has played in academic 
culture is not entirely responsible for a “demand for the highly euphemized, hyper-
coherent discourse of political correctness,” it is an important influencing aspect that has 
been contorted to foster attitudes that are “often thinly veiled justifications of 
class[ism]”(300). Ann Curhoys, identifying the error in speaking of men and women in 
ways undifferentiated by class, compellingly critiques this under-acknowledged position 
of class privilege: 
 How had [women who are highly privileged academics] come to identify the 
 relative privilege and  power of the middle-class men they combated in their 
 working lives with the position of all men? . . . As long as middle class women 
 identify themselves as the oppressed, they have a theoretical basis for continuing 
 to exert class privilege. . . And for Socialists, Marxists, this just won’t do . . . to 
 focus on sexism out of context, to remain willfully blind to the realities of class 
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 privilege and exploitation in this way, we must locate a class-blind feminism as 
 politically reactionary. (157) 
Intellectuals and academics must be aware of the diverse classed relations to education, 
and how the internalized shame working-class people generally experience with 
education has helped foster a sense of resentment towards those who symbolically 
represent epistemic privilege. Neoliberal discourses of perpetual self-improvement that 
preach continued upward mobility in status and income are a part of schools today, but 
this type of discourse constructs classist hierarchies and suggests that some workers are 
worthy of much less than others (Jones and Vagle). Such discourses often result in 
internalized shame for working-class and poor students (Jones and Vagle). 
 Finally, class-sensitivity is necessary outside of the academic setting as well. 
Especially since I have argued that intelligence is a part of everyday life and comes in 
many forms other than what is generally already socially and institutionally legitimized. 
The process of being self-critical, admitting privilege, and acknowledging the ways in 
which practices might be exclusionary to some groups, or might even be perceived as 
hostile to some groups is a difficult, but necessary undertaking. Paulo Freire recommends 
a collaborative process, between members of the dominant and non-dominant classes, to 
examine how class oppression functions. This approach is challenging because it begins 
the process of renegotiating the distribution of status, power, and resources, but this is an 
important stage in the process towards social justice (Freire; Newton).  
 Taking inspiration from Patricia Hill Collins, a path forward might be found in the 
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primary dimensions of Black Feminist Standpoint Theory12. These dimensions include 
valuing the meaning derived from concrete experience and developing both an ethics of 
care and of personal accountability (P.H. Collins). An ethics of care involves an emphasis 
on the value of each individual, the interconnectedness of emotion and reason, and the 
developing of a capacity for empathy and compassion (P.H. Collins). However, with this 
ethic of care comes the ethic of personal accountability, the idea that one must be 
accountable for the knowledge claims that they make (P.H. Collins). There is a level of 
accountability that all people must have and answer for, regardless of their class or other 
facets of personal identity, especially when one espouses destructive and otherwise 
problematic claims regarding others. Perhaps a greater emphasis on class-sensitivity, an 
ethic of care, and an ethic of personal accountability could help to foster a greater 
empathy that would branch outward to other facets of social and political life, promoting 
systemic change towards social justice for other marginalized groups. Most important is 
each individual’s active-participation in dialogue, an intrinsic aspect of coalition building 
(P.H. Collins). Through dialogue and the context of community, “people become more 
human and empowered” (261). By seeing the human in others, even those with whom 
one disagrees with politically or differs from entirely in terms of identity, the “scaffolding 
of an empathy bridge” might begin to take form (Hochschild vi). 
 
                                                        
12 I understand the potential implications of using Black Feminist thought to explain the value of white 
working class men’s experiences, however, I believe that the contours of Black Feminist thought can be 
adapted across race and incorporated into work with other marginalized groups. In fact, Patricia Hill 
Collins states that “the significance of a Black feminist epistemology may lie in its ability to enrich our 
understanding of how subordinate groups create knowledge that fosters both their empowerment and social 
justice” (269). Therefore, I think it is possible to work with these ideas, even if they are used in application 




 In this thesis, I have illustrated how epistemic injustice functions in the divide 
between white working-class men and the educated elite by discussing the discursive 
ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as legitimate 
sources of knowledge. I demonstrated this by using critical discourse analysis to interpret 
the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by Hillary Clinton and Donald 
Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also discussed how these ideologies 
are perceived positively or negatively by Trump’s working-class base—whether they 
appealed to the working-class or reinforced epistemic injustice by insulting their 
intelligence. Using feminist standpoint theory and phenomenology as a foundation of 
thought, I claimed that white working-class men are increasingly alienated from 
progressive politics through classist and ableist rhetoric and that if progressives wish to 
win over white working-class men, they will need to ameliorate this division, otherwise 
this gap will continue to grow.  
 In this final chapter, I have provided a reflection for considering a path forward 
using class-sensitive approaches, both in and out of academic settings, and have 
considered the applicability of adapting dimensions of Black Feminist thought, put 
forward by Patricia Hill Collins, to the experiences of white working-class men. I believe 
this is the most feasible route for ameliorating a divide between white working-class men 
and the educated elite, a divide which has proven difficult to bridge for the Democratic 
Party and progressive politics in general. The three primary dimensions of Black 
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology, valuing concrete experience, the ethic of care, and the 
ethic of personal accountability, is promising for seeking to bridge this gap because it 
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challenges the established methods of knowledge validation that have been used to deny 
the validity of the experiences and knowledge of marginalized groups (P.H. Collins). It 
calls into question the perspectives of the educated elite and the factors they use for 
determining the validity of knowledge. This requires reflexivity in the Bourdieusian 
sense, involving “a turning back upon the position of the knowing subject, a looking back 
at one's own knowing practice,” from both the dominant classes and the white working-
class (Charlesworth 31). 
 The ethic of care and personal accountability are also particularly appropriate for 
the issues addressed here (P.H. Collins). The ethic of personal accountability holds both 
the dominant classes and the white working-class responsible for the knowledge claims 
they make. This is crucial because it acknowledges that this argument for valuing the 
knowledge and experience of white working-class men is not in any way ignoring or 
excusing racist, sexist, and homophobic rhetoric. This accountability also holds elite 
educated people responsible for their classist and ableist rhetoric that occurs in resorting 
to calling into question the intelligence of white working-class men. But with this 
accountability comes the balance of empathy and care, the value of emotion, dialogue, 
and connection. These compassionate connections work to validate knowledge claims 
and lead us collectively to truth (P.H. Collins). 
 These ideas are not far from the “empathy bridges” Hochschild urges the educated 
elite to build, nor the culture of the “disciplined self” Lamont identified among working-
class men. Working-class ideals value the responsibility to care for others, to be honest, 
to recognize the dignity and respect owed to each individual (Lamont et al.). Translating 
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these ideals to an ethics of care and personal accountability is possible, and it will take 
work, but it is work both working-class people and the dominant classes are capable of.  
 Future research might consider interviewing white working-class men to gain 
insight on their perspectives regarding knowledge, intelligence, and how they see 
themselves either fitting or not fitting in to progressive politics. It would be interesting to 
inquire about how they understand intelligence and who they consider intelligent, or if 
they have traits or skills that they believe should be characterized as intelligent. This 
could be helpful for understanding the extent to which they have internalized classist 
beliefs of epistemic credibility and it could help generate conversation for expanding 
what is conceived of as intelligence. Hearing their own accounts could be very fruitful 
terrain for conducting a critical discourse analysis. Of course, it takes an experienced and 
perceptive researcher to conduct this type of fieldwork. Other research might include a 
look into Democratic strategies for appealing to the white working-class demographic in 
future presidential elections. This could include analyzing the speech patterns of 
candidates who are more successful with the demographic to understand which discursive 
trends resonate most. 
 Studying white working-class men as individuals and as a demographic, through a 
lens of empathy and awareness of the ways in which privilege is intersectional, 
recognizing individuals in their multi-faceted identities, and understanding how these 
identities relate to systems of power to simultaneously privilege and marginalize people 
in different ways is critical for feminist research. Honest and careful effort to bridge the 
gap between white working-class men and the educated elite is of great importance in this 
political moment. We need a class-sensitive feminism just as much as we need a feminist 
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movement that takes into consideration race, ethnicity, sexuality, ability, and so forth. My 
hope is that in this thesis I have demonstrated the significance of these points and 
continued a discussion that we should be having so we can understand and see the worth 




FULL TRANSCRIPT OF CLINTON’S SPEECH AT THE LGBT FOR HILLARY 
GALA ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 (Reilly) 
 Thank you all so much. Wow. Thank you. Thank you. It’s sort of like the seventh 
inning stretch. Thank you all. You know, I’ve been saying at events like this lately, I am 
all that stands between you and the apocalypse. Tonight, I’m all that stands between a 
much better outcome! I want to thank Laverne for being here at her first political event. 
Her endorsement, her strong words, her passion, her example, her advocacy on behalf of 
the transgender community, particularly transgender women of color, is just so 
extraordinary, and I love the way she wove in so many of the issues that are up for grabs 
in this election. I think we know what we’re up against. We do, don’t we? 
 [Crowd chants: Yes!] 
 Donald Trump has pledged for appoint Supreme Court justices who will overturn 
marriage equality— 
 [boos] 
And if you have read about the ones he says he’s likely to support, he’s not kidding. In 
fact, if you look at his running mate, his running-mate signed a law that would have 
allowed businesses to discriminate against LGBT Americans. And there’s so much more 
than I find deplorable in his campaign: the way that he cozies up to white supremacist, 
makes racist attacks, calls women pigs, mocks people with disabilities — you can’t make 
this up. He wants to round up and deport 16 million people, calls our military a disaster. 
And every day he says something else which I find so personally offensive, but also 
dangerous. You know, the idea of our country is so rooted in continuing progress that we 
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make together. Our campaign slogan is not just words. We really do believe that we are 
stronger together. We really do believe that showing respect and appreciation for one 
another lifts us all up. 
 And it’s a special commitment that I feel to continuing to fight alongside the 
LGBT community. Because this is one of the continuing struggles. We’re filled in this 
great hall in Cipriani tonight with successful people, raising your glow sticks, thank you 
so much for contributing a little bit more to get the campaign over the finish line. But 
somewhere right now in this city is a kid has been kicked out of his house. Somewhere 
not far from here, maybe a suburb or across state lines, is a young girl who is just not sure 
what her future holds because she just doesn’t feel like she’s herself and no one 
understands that. Some kid getting off the bus at the Port Authority and somebody’s 
waiting to take advantage of that scared but brave kid looking for a different life and a 
future that actually belongs to him or her. 
 We still have a lot of work to do. And if you think of the work we have to do in 
our own country, it pales in comparison to the work we have to do around the world. And 
I’m grateful that in this room are so many people who have broken down barriers, stood 
up to discrimination and bigotry, fought for the rights of everyone. I was in North 
Carolina just yesterday and I told them, it’s not only that discrimination is wrong. It’s bad 
for business. That state which was led down a pathway of discrimination is seeing the 
results — losing jobs, losing the NBA all-star game. Who wants to be associated with a 
governor and a legislation who set out to hurt the people they’re supported to be 
representing and protecting? 
 [Cheers] 
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 In too many places still, LGBT Americans are singled out for harassment and 
violence. You can get married on Saturday, post your pictures on Sunday, and get fired 
on Monday. That’s why we’ve got to continue the forward march of progress. And we 
cannot do it alone. I cannot do it alone. I’m not like Donald Trump who says ‘I alone can 
fix it.’ I’ve never quite figure out what it is he alone can fix. 
 [Laughter/cheers] 
 But that’s not what you’ll hear from me. I think we have to do this together. So, 
together we’re gonna pass the Equality Act to guarantee full equality. We’re going to put 
comprehensive quality affordable health care within reach for more people, including for 
mental health and addiction. We’re gonna take on youth homelessness, and as my 
wonderful, extraordinary, great daughter said, we are going to end the cruel and 
dangerous practice of conversion therapy. We’re going to keep working toward an AIDS-
free generation, a goal that I set as secretary of state, and with your help we’re going to 
pass comprehensive gun laws… 
 [HILL-A-RY chants] 
 I know there are only 60 days left to make our case — and don’t get complacent, 
don’t see the latest outrageous, offensive, inappropriate comment and think well he’s 
done this time. We are living in a volatile political environment. You know, to just be 
grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket 
of deplorables. Right? 
 [Laughter/applause] 
 The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic — you name it. And 
unfortunately there are people like that. And he has lifted them up. He has given voice to 
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their websites that used to only have 11,000 people — now have 11 million. He tweets 
and retweets their offensive hateful mean-spirited rhetoric. Now, some of those folks — 
they are irredeemable, but thankfully they are not America. But the other basket — and I 
know this because I see friends from all over America here — I see friends from Florida 
and Georgia and South Carolina and Texas — as well as, you know, New York and 
California — but that other basket of people are people who feel that the government has 
let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares about them, nobody 
worries about what happens to their lives and their futures, and they’re just desperate for 
change. It doesn’t really even matter where it comes from. They don’t buy everything he 
says, but he seems to hold out some hope that their lives will be different. They won’t 
wake up and see their jobs disappear, lose a kid to heroine, feel like they’re in a dead-end. 
Those are people we have to understand and empathize with as well. 
 [Applause] 
 And what I hope is that in addition to your extraordinary generosity, you will go 
to our website, hillaryclinton.com, or text join to JOIN at 47246 to see how else you can 
get involved. And I want to echo what Chelsea said. We are trying to register 3 million 
more voters and get those voters to commit to vote. We will win if people turn out to 
vote. There is no doubt in my mind that we will win. 
 [Cheers] 
But we can’t take anyone or any place for granted. And therefore I am asking you to 
volunteer for a phone bank, for a canvas — at the very least if you know anybody who’s 
even thinking about voting for Trump, stage an intervention! That may be one conversion 
therapy I endorse. 
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 [Cheers] 
 Just remember: Friends don’t let friends vote for Trump. 
 So we’re going to have a great night tonight because we are so blessed. You 
know, we all love this woman either from afar or luckily enough up close — and for my 
family, it’s been up close. We know she’s the great talent of our time. We know that 
remarkably she’s had a number one album in each of the last six decades. We know that. 
But we also feel and see her heart and her passion. And she’s of course been a great ally 
and supporter of the LGBT community — but of progressive causes and candidates, she’s 
been on the front lines repeatedly, bravely, never giving up or giving in to all of the 
incoming criticism that any of us who stick our necks out often attract. So we’re in for a 
great treat tonight. I could not be happier, more grateful, or excited, than to introduce a 
woman of such extraordinary presence, that really just her first name — spelled correctly 













DONALD TRUMP’S FULL RESPONSE ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 IN 
ASHVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA (C-SPAN) 
 Thank you. I am so thrilled to be back in the great state of North Carolina. In 56 
days, we are going to win this state -- and we are going to win the White House. But to 
do that you must get out and vote, and that means early voting which begins on October 
20th. 
 This is our chance -- our one chance -- to fix our rigged system and create 
prosperity for each and every American. Our vision of hope stands in stark contrast to my 
opponent's campaign of hate. Hillary Clinton has been running a hate-filled and negative 
campaign with no policy, no solutions, and no new ideas. By contrast, I've been going 
around the country offering detailed plans for reform. All of these reform plans are 
available on our website. 
 While my opponent slanders you as deplorable and irredeemable, I call you 
hardworking American patriots who love your country and want a better future for all of 
our people. You are Democrats, Independents and Republicans. Above all else, you are 
Americans -- and you are entitled to leadership that honors you, cherishes you and 
defends you. Every American is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect in our 
country. Whether you vote for me, or whether you vote for someone else, I will be your 
champion in the White House. 
 Hillary Clinton represents only the insiders, the donors and the special interests. I 
will be speaking more about Hillary Clinton's disqualifying remarks in a minute, but first 
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let me invite onto the stage some people who can tell you themselves what they think of 
her spiteful comments.  
 I have some more thoughts on Clinton's remarks I will be sharing momentarily, 
but first I want to tell you what I am going to do to make your life better. We've outlined 
a detailed plan on trade, on immigration, on rebuilding the military, on changing our 
foreign policy. I've delivered a plan on defeating Islamic terrorism, on reforming our tax 
code, on unleashing American energy, and on providing school choice to every 
disadvantaged child in America. We've released policy after policy, solution after 
solution. Every day, we are putting forward new ideas to make your life better. The 
change will start right away, the moment I take my oath of office. 
 On my first day, we are going to immediately terminate every single 
unconstitutional executive order signed by President Obama. Then, I am going to order a 
review of every single regulation issued over the last eight years. All needless, job-killing 
regulations will be cancelled. Millions of new jobs will come pouring in. We are going to 
lift the restriction on American energy -- this will create another half a million new jobs a 
year. That's just the beginning. On my first day in office, I am going to ask Congress to 
send me a bill to immediately repeal and replace disastrous Obamacare -- this will 
instantly save another 2 million jobs. I am also going to propose a massive tax reduction 
to unleash prosperity in every city and state in our country. On that first day, I am also 
going to instruct the Department of Commerce to immediately begin a review of all 
foreign trade practices that unfairly hurt American manufacturing. I will use every lawful 
Presidential power to achieve relief for our workers. You can read the full 7-point trade 
plan on my website, DonaldJTrump.com. 
 89 
 North Carolina has lost more than 4 in 10 manufacturing jobs since NAFTA. Bill 
Clinton signed it, and Hillary Clinton supported it. Right here in Ashville, you've lost 1 in 
5 manufacturing jobs since China joined the World Trade Organization -- another 
Hillary-backed deal. Hillary Clinton owes all of you an apology. And I think you'll get 
that apology right around the same time Hillary Clinton hands over the 33,000 emails she 
deleted. By the way, Hillary Clinton destroyed her emails after she received a 
congressional subpoena. They used a special software called bleach bit. She even made 
her 13 different phones disappear -- some of them were even destroyed with a hammer. 
Hillary Clinton obviously had a whole lot to hide, including her pay-for-play scandals at 
Secretary of State. Pay-for-play with UBS, with Russian Uranium, with contracts for her 
friends and family in Haiti. Nothing is so dangerous to American Democracy as when a 
public official puts their federal office up for sale. Hillary Clinton believes she is above 
the law. 
 She also believes that she is above all of you. After months of hiding from the 
press, Hillary Clinton came out and finally told the world how she feels about the people 
of this country. She said tens of millions of patriotic Americans belong in a "basket of 
deplorables." She talks about people like they're objects, not human beings. She said half 
of our supporters are not even real Americans, and describes the other half as having run 
out of options -- what she can't understand or accept is that the great majority of this 
country now sees right through the lies and deceptions of a failed political establishment. 
They want change, they want justice, and they want a government that puts the American 
people first. 
 Whether our supporters have lost a job to a factory moved to another country, or 
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whether they're a captain in the police department, or a teacher at a local school, they are 
united by their deep and sophisticated understanding of how our political system has 
abandoned the people. For those who have been hit by hard times, they understand better 
than anyone that it's Hillary Clinton's Wall Street agenda that has crushed the middle 
class of this country. 
 Hillary Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans. 
She looks down on them -- she looks down on all the people who make her life possible. 
She looks down on the carpenters, plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants. She 
looks down on the police officers, soldiers, and firefighters supporting our campaign. She 
looks down on the people who cook her meals, drive her cars, and dig the coal that 
powers her electricity. She called these Americans every name in the book -- racist, 
sexist, xenophobic, Islamophobic -- she said they were not even American.  
 Never in history has a major-party presidential candidate so viciously demonized 
the American voter. She was attacking millions of moms and dads who love their 
children and want a better future for all Americans. What should these parents tell their 
children about Hillary Clinton's attacks? To every kid in America tonight, I want you to 
know: your parents are working so hard to make your life better, and to make your 
country better -- and if I get the chance, I will fight right alongside them to deliver a 
better future for everyone. Clinton made her remarks at a high-dollar fundraiser in Wall 
Street. Her goal is simple: to bully the American voter out of voting for change. The 
people who rigged the system want to keep things exactly as they are. They want to keep 
our terrible trade deals. They want to trap children in failing government schools. They 
want massive regulation to keep small businesses from being able to compete. Hillary 
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Clinton can never be President of this country. No one who has such a low opinion of the 
American people can ever be elected as their President. 
 Earlier today I had a chance to spend some time with some more of our most 
amazing Americans. I spent the afternoon with the National Guard Association of the 
United States. These are the heroes who rescue our people in disasters, and who fight our 
wars. These heroes are a permanent testament to the courage and character of our nation. 
We also honor and remember the lives of the service members who have made the 
ultimate sacrifice. There is no greater love than the love shown by the men and women 
who have laid down their lives for this country and its people. Our debt to them is eternal 
and everlasting. One thing that we must do is to ensure that our men and women in 
uniform have the best equipment, resources and tools in the world. We must provide 
them the best medical care while they serve, and the best medical care when they return 
home to civilian life. The Veterans scandals that have occurred under this Administration 
-- and that have been dismissed by my opponent -- are a permanent stain on this 
government. It's just one more way Hillary Clinton only looks out for herself. 
 We must take care of our Veterans. That includes giving Veterans the right to 
choose treatment at either a public VA facility, or the private doctor of their choice. Just 
today we learned that the VA has violated a federal law by failing to make its 
performance records available to consumers. The scandals never seem to end -- but they 
will, when I'm elected President. 
 Nothing makes me more proud than to have the support of the men and women 
who hear the uniform. We've received endorsements from 120 generals and admirals, 
these are the people who know how to keep our country safe. Just today, I was 
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profoundly humbled to gain the endorsement of 14 Medal of Honor recipients. I can't 
even begin to say how much it means to me to have the support of these intrepid heroes. 
Also, today, I was thrilled to announce that Ambassador R. James Woolsey, former head 
of the CIA, is now a senior advisor to our campaign. 
 We are on a mission of change. That includes a new agenda for our inner cities. 
The Democratic Party has run the inner cities for fifty, sixty, seventy years and more. 4 in 
10 African-American children live in poverty, including 45% of those under the age of 
six. 2,900 people have been shot in Chicago since the beginning of the year. For those 
suffering and hurting, I say: give Donald J. Trump a chance. I will fix it. What do you 
have to lose? Let me also tell you what you have to gain: millions of new jobs, higher 
wages, and amazing schools. I will fight for Detroit, for Chicago, for Baltimore, and for 
every neglected part of this nation -- and I will fight to bring us all together as One 
American People. Imagine what our country could accomplish if we started working 
together as One People, under One God, saluting One American Flag. 
 It is time to break with the bitter failures of the past, and to embrace a New 
American Future. In this future, we will respect the dignity of all Americans -- and that 
means great jobs, great schools, and great neighborhoods. We will keep our children safe 
-- which includes steadfast support for American law enforcement. Jobs will return, 
prosperity will rise, and new factories will come rushing back to our shores. Government 
corruption will end. Honesty will be restored. Republicans are the Party of Abraham 
Lincoln and, come November 8th, we will once again have a government of, by and for 
the people. We Will Make America Prosperous Again. We Will Make America Safe 
Again. And Will Make America Great Again. Thank you, and God Bless!  
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